American University Law Review
Volume 62 | Issue 5

Article 3

2013

Regulating Information Security in the
Government Contracting Industry: Will the Rising
Tide Lift All the Boats
Keir X. Bancroft

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Bancroft, Keir X. "Regulating Information Security in the Government Contracting Industry: Will the Rising Tide Lift All the Boats."
American University Law Review 62, no.5 (2013): 1145-1202.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in American University Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.

Regulating Information Security in the Government Contracting
Industry: Will the Rising Tide Lift All the Boats
Keywords

America the Virtual: Security, Privacy, and Interoperability in an Interconnected World, United States.
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, United States. Dept. of Defense, Government contractors -- Legal status,
laws, etc., Data security failures, Computer security -- Law & legislation, Disclosure of information -- Law &
legislation -- United States, Public contracts -- United States, Cyberspace -- Security measures -- Law &
legislation

This article is available in American University Law Review: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr/vol62/iss5/3

BANCROFT.OFF_TO_WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

7/3/2013 10:44 AM

ARTICLES
REGULATING INFORMATION SECURITY IN
THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING
INDUSTRY: WILL THE RISING TIDE LIFT
ALL THE BOATS?
KEIR X. BANCROFT
The government is strengthening cyber and information security
regulations to address increasing cybersecurity risks.
These
regulations will affect government contractors in many ways; for
instance, contractors must apply new technologies to monitor
cybersecurity threats and develop stronger information security
protections. This “rising tide” of regulation should lift “all boats,”
namely members of the government contracts sector. Some small
business contractors or larger contractors without experience
working with the government, however, may not be equipped to fully
comply with these strengthened regulations. The government may as
a result lose a number of would-be competitors for contracts
requiring cyber and information security protections. Alternatively,
some contractors lacking resources and experience may compete for
the contracts anyway, which could serve to weaken the security of
government information and information systems. This Article gives
an overview of existing and new regulatory requirements and analyzes
 Keir Bancroft practices law at Venable LLP in Washington, DC, where he
regularly counsels clients in the government contracting industry on information
security issues. Mr. Bancroft is the former Privacy Officer at the United States
Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Engraving and Printing, where he advised
the Bureau on matters pertaining to privacy and information security. The author
would like to thank Peter Frechette, Andrew Hernacki, Estefania San Juan, and the
members of the American University Law Review for inviting him to contribute this
timely and important symposium, and their efforts in bringing this Article from
concept to fruition.
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the difficulties some contractors may have complying with them.
This Article also suggests ways to ensure all contractors can effectively
comply with the regulations.
Federal agencies can develop
incentives, protections, or training requirements for contractors.
Agencies can also develop opportunities for information sharing,
which would help smaller or larger, inexperienced contractors get
involved in contracts requiring cyber and information security in a
manner that better ensures compliance and mitigates security risk.
The government may also want to develop an iterative process of
regulation, which would help ensure all contractors can keep pace
with the increases in cyber and information security regulation.
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INTRODUCTION
There is an oft-quoted aphorism that “a rising tide lifts all the
boats.”1 It has often been used to support a variety of economic
policies. President Kennedy used the analogy to support federal
investment in a dam project in Arkansas. The rationale for the
investment was that the benefit to a section of Arkansas would bear
benefits to the states in general.2 Thus, the resulting collective
good—the “rising tide”—would benefit all individuals. In later years,
President Reagan and other proponents of supply-side economics
used the same phrase to support a philosophy that favorable
economic conditions for business would spur economic growth,
contribute to an overall stronger economy, and hence, benefit
everyone.3
1. President John F. Kennedy, Remarks at the Dedication of Greers Ferry Dam,
Heber Springs, Arkansas (Oct. 3, 1963), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/
ws/index.php?pid=9455.
2. Id.
3. President Ronald Reagan, Address to the Nation on the Economy (Feb. 5,
1981), available at http://www.ronaldreaganmemorial.com/pdf/Address_Nation_the_
Economy_020581.pdf.
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In the context of cybersecurity regulation of the government
contracting community, it appears the federal government is
operating with the same philosophy. Steadily—though with varying
degrees of speed—the federal government has raised standards for
cyber and information security. Few would deny this is a positive
trend.4 The risk of harm arising from cybersecurity breaches and the
exposure of sensitive information warrants increased vigilance and
protection.5 The means by which the federal government is
mandating that protection, however, threatens to outpace the
technology and resources available for subsets of the government
contracting community, particularly small businesses.
The
regulations might also affect larger businesses just entering the
government contracts industry or seeking work with new federal
agencies; they may find that the cost of compliance outweighs the
benefit of participating in the new market.6 In that sense, the rising
tide arguably lifts some “boats,” but only those equipped with the
technology and resources necessary to brave the waves of
cyberthreats. It is difficult to see how some “boats” lacking the
technology and experience to implement new protections can rise
with the regulatory tide. They may not have the technology required
to ensure the necessary cyber and information security protections
required under new regulation.7 Further, they may lack the
experience necessary to ensure appropriate cyber and information
security. In that respect, the rising tide does not promise to lift all

4. See generally Nat’l Sec. Counsel, The Comprehensive National Cybersecurity
Initiative, WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/cybersecurity/comprehensivenational-cybersecurity-initiative (last visited June 10, 2013) (noting that President
Obama has indicated cybersecurity is one of the most important pressing challenges
our nation faces).
5. See, e.g., Adam Clark Estes, Somebody, Probably Anonymous, Hacked the Fed During
the Super Bowl, ATL. WIRE (Feb. 5, 2013), http://www.theatlanticwire.com/technology/
2013/02/somebody-probably-anonymous-hacked-fed-during-superbowl/61838 (discussing the
recent breach of the Federal Reserve system).
6. For instance, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) states it is the policy
of the federal government to “provide maximum practicable opportunities in its
acquisitions” to all small business concerns, including the following: veteran-owned,
small business; service-disabled, veteran-owned, small business; Historically
Underutilized Business Zone (“HUBZone”) small business; small disadvantaged
business; and women-owned, small business concerns. FAR § 19.201(a) (2012).
Further, these small business concerns “must also have the maximum practicable
opportunity to participate as subcontractors in the contracts awarded by any
executive agency, consistent with efficient contract performance.” Id.
7. See, e.g., Dietrich Knauth, Obama’s Cybersecurity Order Could Squeeze Contractors,
LAW 360 (Feb. 26, 2013), http://www.law360.com/articles/416900/obama-scybersecurity-order-could-squeeze-contractors (suggesting that President Obama’s
Executive Order asks too much of government contractors because of the fast pace at
which hacker technology evolves).
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boats. In fact, it appears some “boats” are at risk of foundering
amidst waves that they are not equipped to navigate.
For example, information security protections previously reserved
for classified information are now imposed on a much broader and
amorphous species: controlled unclassified information (CUI). The
problem is that the varying definitions of types of CUI make it
difficult to ascertain what information must be protected as CUI.
Further, the CUI paradigm imposes record handling and protection
requirements on information to which a great many government
contractors may have access. This increases the chance that
government contractors previously unfamiliar with information
security requirements will be thrust into a new regime requiring
increased security and information security expertise.
In another example, Department of Defense (DoD) cyber and
information security regulation has evolved over recent years, initially
imposing broad information security protection requirements, and
later scaling back those requirements to focus on the most basic
information security protections. But in each instance, the DoD has
made significant assumptions that the technology necessary to
provide for such protections is readily available and (presumably) can
be readily implemented by all government contractors, including
small businesses. It is not clear that this is the case; consequently,
small businesses which the federal government actively seeks to
provide with contracting opportunities may be ill equipped to meet
information security requirements. Other larger businesses that are
new to the government contracting industry may determine that the
costs of compliance are too prohibitive. This, in turn could reduce
competition for government contracts. As competition helps to keep
prices lower, the reduced competition for contracts could increase
the costs of procurements.
Finally, the Federal Information Security Management Act of 20028
(FISMA), which was passed to regulate protection of government
information, is being implemented and amended in such a way as to
require investment in technologies that allow for constant
monitoring for breaches.9 This arguably represents a shift from the
original, risk-based model that FISMA established. Until recently,
FISMA dictated the degree of information security necessary for
implementation based on the risk of an unauthorized release of

8. 44 U.S.C. §§ 3541–3549 (2006).
9. Id.
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government information.10 More recently, the Special Publications
and upcoming FISMA amendments are dictating a more prescriptive
approach, mandating technology such as continuous monitoring to
ensure information security is maintained.11 Again, the results of
these new requirements could serve to inhibit small businesses from
participation in certain opportunities with the government. Indeed,
the requirements could also affect the ability of larger, more
experienced contractors to comply. Larger businesses, be they
established government contractors or business concerns with wellestablished commercial contracting practices seeking opportunities
to contract with the federal government, may already have
established information security practices. To the extent these larger
contractors need to alter their information security infrastructure
and practices to satisfy new regulatory requirements, the results may
prove to be as prohibitive as they are for small businesses.
As the federal government mandates increased information
security requirements, a dividing line may appear between those
contractors with the size, experience, or resources12 necessary to
comply with those requirements, and those lacking those
characteristics. On its face, the result could operate to restrict
contracting opportunities to contractors who are already better
equipped to address information security requirements and the
changes thereto. More disconcerting, however, is the potential that
certain business concerns, seeking to establish a foothold in the
government market or seeking to work with a new agency,13 may
undertake information security responsibilities that they are not
equipped to handle. The results could be disastrous. If a business
undertakes too much security responsibility and then experiences a
breach, it would implicate the privacy, safety, and security interests of
the business itself, the federal customer, and potentially a variety of
other individuals. In a case like this, the few boats that cannot rise
with the tide may bring down the additional boats as well.

10. See infra Part I.F (demonstrating how previous acts based the degree of
required security on the corresponding levels of risk).
11. See infra Parts II.B, III (examining present and proposed amendments
mandating a more comprehensive approach to the security requirements).
12. In some cases, new market entrants or established business concerns seeking
to work with the federal government or with new federal agencies may determine
that the cost of altering their established information security infrastructure and
policies to satisfy new regulation may prove prohibitive.
13. See generally Julia L. Rogers, Winning Government Contracts: Five Things You Need to
Know, ENTREPRENEUR (Dec. 24, 2011), http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/217779
(explaining why the government contract market is lucrative for businesses and how
businesses can enter the market).
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This Article analyzes how small businesses and other inexperienced
government contractors may be unable to effectively comply with
increasing information security requirements. This Article also
explores some possible solutions that could ameliorate the effects of
the rising tide and ensure that small businesses and inexperienced
government contractors continue to have a role in those projects
calling for increased information security requirements.
The federal government can leverage tools already in place to help
ensure that all government contractors are well equipped to
safeguard information.
One example is the mentor-protégé
programs established at the Small Business Administration (SBA) and
a number of other federal agencies.14 Similarly, the “fifty percent
rule,” which mandates that small business prime contractors perform
an established percentage of contracts, might be augmented to create
carve-outs for large-business technology and information security
specialists to contribute to the operations of small businesses.15
Another solution may be an information security training
requirement, similar to the privacy training mandated in October
2011,16 which would help ensure all small businesses are keeping pace
with changes in information security requirements.17
Further, agencies would do well to communicate and collaborate
on matters pertaining to information security.18 To the extent
information security requirements are consistent across the DoD,
DHS, and other civilian agencies, the chances for confusion are
reduced. If contractors are complying with similar regulatory
regimes, there is less chance that contractors who may not have
experience working with a specific department or agency will miss
particular requirements.
Finally, the federal government may seek to continue what it has
already started with regulatory requirements—taking a smaller-scale,
iterative approach to information security.19 As can be seen from
DoD regulation of information security and subsequent efforts to
14. See infra Part IV.A (describing and proposing amendments to the SBA’s
mentor-protégé programs). The federal government already incentivizes small
businesses to enter into mentor-protégé arrangements with large businesses.
15. See infra Part IV.B (outlining a potential amendment to the fifty percent rule
to increase collaboration between large and small business).
16. Privacy Training, 76 Fed. Reg. 63,896 (proposed Oct. 14, 2011) (to be
codified at FAR pts. 24, 52).
17. See infra Part IV.C (discussing the privacy training mandate as a model that
sets minimum standards but also provides contractors with an option to design their
own programs).
18. See infra Part IV.D (identifying information sharing as one a successful
initiative and encourage expanding the use of information sharing).
19. See infra Part IV.E (proposing an iterative approach to security requirements).
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require more basic information security requirements, the move from
a wider to a smaller-scale approach to regulation could make for a
more viable set of requirements and make it relatively easier for
government contractors to comply. The tide, in effect, would still be
rising, but at a slower rate. This could help the “boats” rise along
with it.
I.

BACKGROUND ON INFORMATION SECURITY LAWS AND
REGULATIONS

Though the broad concept of cybersecurity has brought the issue
to the fore, information security legislation and regulation has been
promulgated in a number of different laws throughout the past thirty
years.20 A brief overview of these laws demonstrates how information
security requirements have evolved with technology and provides
useful context for understanding the new cybersecurity regulations.
A. The Paperwork Reduction Act
In 1980, Congress passed the Paperwork Reduction Act,21
recognizing agencies engaged in “collections of information” from
the public, and authorizing the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) to regulate those activities.22 The Paperwork Reduction Act
recognized a systematic process by which federal agencies would
collect information from persons and other nongovernmental
organizations.23 For example, the term “collection of information”
calls for obtaining, soliciting, or requiring “the disclosure to third
parties or the public, of facts or opinions by or for an agency,
requiring either (1) answers to identical questions or identical
reporting requirements imposed on ten or more persons or (2)
answers to questions posed to “agencies, instrumentalities, or
employees of the United States which are to be used for general
statistical purposes.”24 The Act also established the Office of
20. See, e.g., Computer Security Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-235, 101 Stat.
1724 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 278g-3, 278g-4 (2006)); Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006); Government Information Security
Reform Act, 40 U.S.C. § 11103(a); Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501–
3520 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010); Federal Information Security Management Act of
2002, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3541–3549 (2006); Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104106, 110 Stat. 679. See generally Daniel M. White, Note, Federal Information Security
Management Act of 2002: A Potemkin Village, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 369 (2010) (tracing
the history of information security legislation).
21. Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94 Stat. 2812 (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501–3521
(2006)).
22. 44 U.S.C. § 3506 (2006).
23. Id. § 3507.
24. Id. § 3502(3)(A).
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Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) to supervise the use of
information resources.25 The Act charged the OIRA Director with
providing direction and overseeing the agency management of
information and records in order to protect the privacy of these
materials and promote the proper use of information technologies.26
The Paperwork Reduction Act demonstrates the federal
government’s understanding that it often collects sensitive
information requiring protection of the “privacy, confidentiality,
security, disclosure, and sharing of information.”27 Further, the
federal government recognized that the “acquisition and use of
information technology” would be a key factor in the gathering and
maintenance of information from the public.28
B. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
In 1984, Congress passed the first iteration of the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act,29 criminalizing improper access to information on
government computers. The Act criminalized the knowing or
intentional, unauthorized access to certain computers for a number
of reasons, including the following: gathering information related to
national defense, foreign relations, or nuclear energy;30 obtaining
financial records, or otherwise accessing protected computers31
within federal agencies;32 accessing federal agencies’ nonpublic
computers without authorization;33 accessing information maintained
on federal agency nonpublic computers;34 transmitting computer
viruses for purposes of causing damage to the computer;35 trafficking
in computer access information, including passwords;36 and extorting
persons via threat to impair the confidentiality of information, or
25. Id. § 3504(a)(1).
26. Id. § 3504(a)(1)(B) (giving the director the power to control “agency
dissemination of and public access to information,” “records management activities,”
“privacy, confidentiality, security, disclosure, and sharing of information,” and “the
acquisition and use of information technology, including alternative information
technologies that provide for electronic submission, maintenance, or disclosure of
information as a substitute for paper and for the use and acceptance of electronic
signatures”).
27. Id. § 3504(a)(1)(B)(v).
28. Id. § 3504(a)(1)(B)(vi).
29. 18 U.S.C. § 1030.
30. Id. § 1030(a)(1).
31. “Protected computers” under the Act are defined as those exclusively for use
of a financial institution or the United States government, or used in or affecting
interstate or foreign commerce or communication. Id. § 1030(e)(2).
32. Id. § 1030(a)(2)(B).
33. Id. § 1030(a)(3).
34. Id.
35. Id. § 1030(a)(5)(A).
36. Id. § 1030(a)(6).
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otherwise damaging a protected computer.37 Furthermore, the Act
provided federal grounds for prosecuting computer crimes,
including the unauthorized access or use of nonpublic or
confidential information.38
C. The Computer Security Act of 1987
In what could be described as a precursor to more recent riskbased information security legislation, the Computer Security Act of
198739 established minimum security practices to protect security and
privacy of sensitive information on federal computer systems.
Specifically, it directed the National Bureau of Standards to develop
standards and guidelines to maintain and promote the security and
privacy of sensitive information in federal computer systems.40
Further, it required “establishment of security plans by all operators
of Federal computer systems that contain sensitive information”41 and
required “mandatory periodic training for all persons involved in
management, use, or operation of Federal computer systems that
contain sensitive information.”42 Specifically, the Computer Security
Act required the National Bureau of Standards to develop explicit
technical, management, physical, and administrative standards and
guidelines to protect sensitive information.43 These standards and
guidelines were to be submitted to the Secretary of Commerce along
with recommendations as to the extent that they should be made
compulsory and binding.44 The Secretary, in turn, was authorized to
issue standards, making them compulsory and binding to the extent
necessary.45 The Act also mandated that every federal agency, within
one year of the Act’s enactment, identify all computer systems under
its supervision and create a plan for the security and privacy of each
system identified.46 The agency’s plan was to be commensurate with
the risk and magnitude of the consequences that would result from
the loss, misuse, unauthorized access to, or modification of the
37. Id. § 1030(a)(7).
38. For a discussion of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, see generally Andrew
T. Hernacki, Comment, A Vague Law in a Smartphone World: Limiting the Scope of
Unauthorized Access Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1543,
1544 (2012), arguing for a narrow interpretation of unauthorized access.
39. Pub. L. No. 100-235, 101 Stat. 1724 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 278g-3,
278g-4 (2006)).
40. Id. § 2(b)(1).
41. Id. § 2(b)(3).
42. Id. § 2(b)(4).
43. Id. § 3.
44. Id.
45. Id. § 4.
46. Id. § 6.
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information contained in its system.47 A summary of the security plan
was required to be included in each agency’s five-year plan, and it was
subject to the approval of the Director of OMB. Further, the plan
was required to be revised annually.48 Thus, the Act once again
demonstrated the federal government’s recognition of a need to
protect sensitive information on its computers.
D. The Clinger-Cohen Act
Beginning in the mid-1990s, the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996
invested the OMB Director with federal information technology
responsibilities.49 Those responsibilities required coordination with
the Department of Commerce for development of “standards and
guidelines pertaining to Federal computer systems . . . through the
National Institute of Standards and Technology.”50 The OMB
Director was also required to direct heads of federal agencies to
establish capital planning processes for selecting, managing, and
evaluating the results of all major investments in information
systems.51 The process involves a determination of whether the
function to be supported by the system should be performed by the
private sector, an executive agency, or some combination.52 Even
with the assignment of responsibilities to the OMB Director for
implementation of federal information technology acquisition policy,
the government has expressly considered the involvement of
contractors in the development and implementation of information
systems. Of course, agency heads are also required to “ensure that
the information security policies, procedures, and practices are
adequate.”53 Further, the OMB Director is required under ClingerCohen to “implement through the budget process periodic reviews of

47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Pub. L. No. 104-106, 110 Stat. 186 (1996). The Federal Acquisition
Streamlining Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-355, 108 Stat. 3243 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.), the Federal Acquisition Reform Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-106, div. D, §§ 4001–4402, 110 Stat. 642, and the Information Technology
Management Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106, div. E, §§ 5001–5703, 110
Stat. 679 (1996), are now collectively known as the Clinger-Cohen Act. The ClingerCohen Act also repealed the central authority of the GSA Administrator for
acquisitions of information technology, which had previously been authorized under
Federal Property and Administrative Services Act. Clinger-Cohen Act § 5101.
50. Clinger-Cohen Act § 5112(d). The National Bureau of Standards was renamed
the National Institute of Standards and Technology in 1988. 15 U.S.C. § 271(b)(1)
(2006).
51. Clinger-Cohen Act § 5113(b)(2)(A).
52. Id. § 5113(b)(2)(B).
53. Id. § 5123.
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selected information resources management activities of the
executive agencies.”54
Echoing the requirements of the Computer Security Act, the
Clinger-Cohen Act authorizes the Secretary of Commerce “on the
basis of standards and guidelines developed by the National Institute
of Standards and Technology . . . [to] promulgate standards and
guidelines pertaining to Federal computer systems.”55 It alsogives the
Secretary discretion to make such standards mandatory when
necessary to make the operations, security, or privacy of federal
computer systems more efficient.56 Essentially, the Act sought to
standardize the federal government’s information technology
management policies while ensuring the maintenance of an adequate
level of security and privacy.
E. OMB Circular A-130
To implement the requirements under these and related laws and
manage federal information resources, the OMB promulgated
Circular No. A-130.57 More specifically, OMB under Circular A-130
establishes minimum controls for inclusion in federal automated
information
security
programs;
assigns
federal
agencies
responsibilities for securing automated information; and links
automated information security programs and management control
systems within federal agencies.58
F.

The Government Information Security Reform Act

Later, in 2000, Congress passed the Government Information
Security Reform Act (GISRA).59 GISRA established information
security management program requirements for agencies controlling
GISRA
both unclassified and national security programs.60
implemented risk-based policies, designed to both identify risks and

54. Id. § 5113(b)(4).
55. Id. § 5131(a)(1).
56. Id. § 5131(a)(2).
57. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB CIRCULAR
NO. A-130 (Revised) (2000) [hereinafter REVISED OMB CIRCULAR A-130], available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/omb/circulars/a130/a13
0trans4.pdf (listing its authority for creating a policy for the management of federal
information resources).
58. Id. app. III.
59. Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001,
Pub. L. No. 106-398, tit. X, subtit. G, 114 Stat. 1654A-266 (2000).
60. Id. § 1061.
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determine security needs commensurate with the level of risk.61
GISRA was, however, time-limited by a two-year sunset provision.62
Two years later, FISMA made permanent many of the risk-based
information security requirements established by GISRA. Given the
federal government’s history of legislation aimed at ensuring the
security of its information, its most recent attempt at bolstering this
security serves as the latest in a long line of legislation passed in
recognition of the rising tide and the growing need to raise all of the
boats.
II. THE FEDERAL INFORMATION SECURITY MANAGEMENT ACT
The Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA)
passed in 2002.63 FISMA had six stated purposes: (1) to provide a
framework for ensuring the effectiveness of security controls; (2) to
provide a comprehensive “governmentwide” security management
system; (3) to develop minimum controls to protect federal
information; (4) to improve oversight of information security
programs; (5) to maintain a commercial focus and recognize the
efficacy of information security measures developed in the private
sector; and (6) to recognize agency discretion in selecting security
solutions.64
Though FISMA is broad in scope,65 it also applies a risk-based
approach to information security and calls for agencies to provide
security protections for information, which are to be commensurate
with the potential risk of harm resulting from unauthorized access
and other disturbances of information systems.66
As OMB underscored in its 2011 guidance to federal agencies,
FISMA’s broad reach applies to contractors as well as federal
agencies.67 In fact, FISMA applies to all organizations that possess
federal information or have access to federal systems including
61. Id. (“Policies under this subsection shall . . . be founded on a continuing risk
management cycle that recognizes the need to (i) identify, assess, and understand
risk; and, (ii) determine security needs commensurate with the level of risk.”).
62. Id. (amending 44 U.S.C. § 3536 to read, “[t]his subchapter shall not be in effect
after the date that is two years after the date on which this subchapter takes effect”).
63. 44 U.S.C. §§ 3541–3549 (2006).
64. Id. § 3541 (discussing, in detail, the purpose of FISMA).
65. Id. (stating that it is intended to provide “governmentwide” management,
oversight, and coordination “throughout the civilian, national security, and law
enforcement communities”).
66. Id. § 3544(a).
67. See Memorandum from Jacob J. Lew, Office of Mgmt. & Budget, for Heads of
Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies (Sept. 14, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
default/files/omb/memoranda/2011/m11-33.pdf (explaining that FISMA applies to
services that are partially or entirely provided by contractors).
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contractors, local governments, and even software subscription
services.68
A. Applying the Federal Information Processing Standard
The extent and effect of obligations on contractors derives from
the Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) and the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special
Publications (SP) issued by NIST.69 FIPS, subject to approval by the
Secretary of Commerce, imposes mandatory standards on federal
agencies and contractors (or any “other organizations”) that possess
federal information or operate federal information systems.70 The
basic FIPS-mandated standards and requirements include FIPS
Publication 199:
Standards for Security Categorization of Federal
Information and Information Systems,71 and FIPS Publication 200:
Minimum Security Requirements for Federal Information and Information
Systems.72

68. Memorandum from Roberta Stempfley, Acting Assistant Sec’y, Office of
Cybersecurity & Commc’ns, for the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies (Aug. 24, 2011),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/2011/m1133.pdf (“Because FISMA applies to both information and information systems used by
the agency, contractors, and other organizations and sources, it has somewhat
broader applicability than prior security law. That is, agency information security
programs apply to all organizations (sources) which possess or use Federal
information—or which operate, use, or have access to Federal information systems
(whether automated or manual)—on behalf of a Federal agency.
Other
organizations may include contractors, grantees, State and Local Governments,
industry partners, providers of software subscription services, etc. FISMA, therefore,
underscores longstanding OMB policy concerning sharing Government information
and interconnecting systems.”).
69. See Development Schedule for FISMA Implementation Project Publications, NAT’L
INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH. (Jan. 17, 2013), http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/fisma/
documents/milestone-schedule-v55.pdf (setting forth the timeline for FISMA
implementation).
70. 15 U.S.C. § 278g-3(a) (2006)(authorizing NIST to “develop standards and
guidelines, including minimum requirements, for information systems used or
operated by an agency or by a contractor of an agency or other organization on
behalf of an agency, other than national security systems”); 40 U.S.C. § 11331
(establishing authority of the Secretary of Commerce to promulgate standards and
guidelines pertaining to Federal computer systems); 44 U.S.C. § 3543 (directing the
OMB Director to oversee agency information security policies and practices).
71. NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., DEP’T OF COMMERCE, FIPS PUB. NO. 199,
STANDARDS FOR SECURITY CATEGORIZATION OF FEDERAL INFORMATION AND INFORMATION
SYSTEMS 1 (2004) [hereinafter FIPS 199], available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/
fips/fips199/FIPS-PUB-199-final.pdf.
72. NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., DEP’T OF COMMERCE, FIPS PUB. NO. 200,
MINIMUM SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR FEDERAL INFORMATION AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS,
at iv (2006) [hereinafter FIPS 200], available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/
fips200/FIPS-200-final-march.pdf.
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1. FIPS publication 199: Standards for security categorization of federal
information and information systems
FIPS 199 applies to information and information systems other
than national security systems.73 Information under FIPS 199 is
categorized according to its information type.74 An information type
spans a range of categories; including privacy, medical, proprietary,
financial,
investigative,
contractor-sensitive,
and
security
75
management. These types are generally defined by an organization;
or by laws, directives, policies, regulations, or Executive Orders.76 In
accordance with FISMA, FIPS 199 defines three “security objectives”
according to the ability of an information processor to ensure
“confidentiality,” “integrity,” and “availability” of information.77
Explicitly defined under FIPS 199, a loss of confidentiality is the
“unauthorized disclosure of information”; a loss of integrity is the
“unauthorized modification or destruction of information”; and the
loss of availability is the “disruption of access or use of information or
an information system.” The loss of any of these objectives as they
pertain to information or an information system amounts to a
security breach under FIPS 199. The effect of a security breach is
determined on three levels of potential impacts on organizations or
individuals falling under FISMA, and is determined in the context of
the organization and the overall national interest. The impacts
include the following:
Low Impact (or Minor Harm): A low impact breach poses a
“limited adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational
assets, or individuals.”78 Low impact equates to “minor harm,” a
limited adverse effect—meaning that the loss of confidentiality
integrity, or availability might result in the following: (i) a
degradation in mission capability to an extent and duration that
the organization is able to perform its primary functions, but the
effectiveness of the functions is noticeably reduced; (ii) minor
damage to organizational assets; (iii) minor financial loss; or (iv)
minor harm to individuals.79
Moderate Impact (or Significant Harm): A moderate impact
breach poses a “serious adverse effect on organizational operations,
73. FIPS 199, supra note 71, at 1.
74. Id. at 1 n.1 (“Information is categorized according to its information type. An
information type is a specific category of information . . . defined by an organization
or, in some instances, by a specific law . . . .”).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 2.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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organizational assets, or individuals.”80 This equates to “significant
harm,” meaning that the loss of confidentiality, integrity, or
availability might result in the following:
(i) a significant
degradation in mission capability to an extent and duration that
the organization is able to perform its primary functions, but the
effectiveness of the functions is significantly reduced; (ii)
significant damage to organizational assets; (iii) significant
financial loss; or (iv) significant harm to individuals that does not
involve loss of life or serious life threatening injuries.81
High Impact (or Severe Harm): A high impact breach poses a
“severe or catastrophic adverse effect on organizational operations,
organizational assets, or individuals.”82 This equates to “severe
harm,” meaning that the loss of confidentiality, integrity, or
availability might result in the following: (i) a severe degradation
in or loss of mission capability to an extent and duration that the
organization is not able to perform one or more of its primary
functions; (ii) major damage to organizational assets; (iii) major
financial loss; or (iv) severe or catastrophic harm to individuals
involving loss of life or serious life threatening injuries.

Based on the security objectives of confidentiality, integrity, and
availability, and the definition of potential impacts as either low,
moderate, or high, NIST prescribes a method for developing security
categorizations (SC) among information types (again, generally
defined by organizations, laws, policy, regulations, guidelines, or
Executive Orders) by employing a generalized format, which
considers both the security objective and the level of impact.83 For
example, FIPS 199 maps out the risk related to a particular
information type according to the magnitude of impact to each of its
security objectives.84 First, the potential security category information
types are set forth, placing a separate security objective with its
concomitant impact: “SC information type = {(confidentiality,
impact), (integrity, impact), (availability, impact)}.”85 Next, the values,
low, moderate, high, or not applicable (N/A) are applied.86 FIPS 199
illustrates this system with examples.87 For instance, an organization
managing public information on a web server may determine that
there is no potential impact from loss of confidentiality (i.e.,

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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confidentiality requirements are not applicable), moderate potential
impact from a loss of integrity, and moderate potential impact from a
loss of availability.88
FIPS 199 is a logical analysis because public information is, by
definition, not confidential. Thus, even if that information were to
be disclosed without authorization, it would not be confidential, and
there would be no potential impact. In contrast, with information
integrity, there is the possibility of significant harm. Even if the
information in question is not confidential, there is a vested interest
in its integrity, i.e., its veracity and authenticity. If there is a security
breach affecting the integrity of the information, there could be
significant questions about an organization’s ability to secure the
information, or simply questions about the organization itself. It also
makes sense that a breach affecting the availability of the public
information would have a moderate impact. If the public loses access
to the organization’s information, and there are doubts about its
availability, there again can be questions about the organization’s
ability to secure the information. Further, the public may no longer
look to obtain information from that organization.89
FIPS 199 maintains fidelity to FISMA’s risk-based approach to
information security by matching the security objectives with
potential impacts.
It provides a range of potential security
categorizations, all of which involve matching security objectives with
the potential impact a security breach would have on each of those
objectives. The extent of the impact, if any, will be driven by the type
of information and information system in question. Thus, FIPS 199 is
consistent with FISMA because the information or the system itself,
and the organization’s evaluation of that information, is the driver of
security categorizations under FISMA.
2. FIPS 200: Minimum security requirements for federal information and
information systems
Another key information security standard is FIPS 200.90 FIPS 200,
which is applicable to all unclassified information within the federal
government, complements the FIPS 199 standards for security
categorization.91 Taken another way, FIPS 199 supplies the what, by
88. As a result of that analysis, the security categorization of the
organization’s public information is set forth as follows under FIPS 199: “SC
public information = {(confidentiality, NA), (integrity, MODERATE), (availability,
MODERATE)}.” Id.
89. Id.
90. FIPS 200, supra note 72.
91. Id. at iv.
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determining what level of security categorization applies to
information types and information systems;92 FIPS 200 supplies the
how, by specifying the minimum level of security requirements that
must be applied to meet the security categorizations established
under FIPS 199 standards.93 Under FIPS 200, NIST prescribes
seventeen security-related areas that need to be addressed to confront
“management, operational, and technical aspects of protecting
federal information and information systems.”94
These broad
prescriptions include several aspects of information management
including controlling accessibility of information; ensuring that
managers have a solid understanding of security risks; establishing
contingency plans; and assessing potential risk. While FIPS 199 and
200 together identify information systems that require protection and
specific security goals, the 800 Series of NIST Special Publications
provides organizations with specific guidance on how to reach these
goals.95
B. Following the 800 Series of NIST Special Publications
To satisfy FIPS 200 security specifications, federal agencies are
required to follow the guidance under Special Publication (SP) 80053: Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and
Organizations.96 Using SP 800-53, organizations must take the security
categorizations established pursuant to FIPS 199 and apply baseline
92. Compare id. at 1 (explaining that FIPS 200 is intended to specify minimum
security measures), with FIPS 199, supra note 71, at 1 (explaining that FIPS 199 is
intended to categorize information and information systems).
93. FIPS 200, supra note 72, at 1.
94. Id. at 2–4 (identifying the following categories: Access Control; Awareness
and Training; Audit and Accountability; Certification, Accreditation and Security
Assessments; Configuration Management; Contingency Planning; Identification and
Authentication; Incident Response; Maintenance; Media Protection; Physical and
Environmental Protection; Planning; Planning; Personnel Security; Risk Assessment;
System and Services Acquisition; System and Communications Protection; and
System and Information Integrity).
95. Id.
96. See NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., DEP’T OF COMMERCE, SPEC. PUB. NO.
800-53, REV. 4, SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONTROLS FOR FEDERAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS
AND ORGANIZATIONS, at iv (2013) [hereinafter SP 800-53], available at
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf. It should
be noted that the latest version of SP 800-53 is Revision 4, released in April 2013. Unless
otherwise noted, all references to SP 800-53 are to Revision 4. Id. Special
publications have been promulgated by NIST to complement and in this case,
implement FIPS requirements. The special publications reflect outreach efforts on
matters pertaining to computer security, and are reflective of NIST’s collaborative
activities with industry, government, and academic organizations. Pursuant to FIPS
200, “[f]ederal agencies must meet the minimum security requirements as defined
herein through the use of the security controls in accordance with NIST Special
Publication 800-53.” FIPS 200, supra note 72, at v.
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security controls, tailored to meet the specific organizational and
security controls necessary to assure adequate security.97 OMB
defines adequate security as security “commensurate with the risk and
magnitude of harm resulting from the loss, misuse, or unauthorized
access to or modification of information.”98 Again, the focus of
information security under FISMA is a risk-based regime, which
provides a degree of flexibility and discretion to those charged with
securing information and systems.99
Reflecting the security categorizations under FIPS 199, FIPS 200
requires organizations to establish baseline security controls under SP
800-53 to ensure adequate security appropriate to the level of risk.
The baseline security controls are defined according to their level of
impact.100
Therefore, for low-impact information systems, an
organization must “employ appropriately tailored security controls
from the low baseline of security controls defined in [SP 800-53]” and
“ensure that the minimum assurance requirements associated with
the low baseline are satisfied.”101 Similarly, for moderate-impact
information systems, the “moderate baseline” of security controls
must be used for tailoring.102 For high-impact information systems, a
“high baseline” of security controls must be used for tailoring.103
These controls are applied on a tiered approach, whereby risk is
evaluated at different organizational levels.104
SP 800-53’s flexibility permits organizations to customize their
security control baselines to align with the goals of the particular
entity.105 These controls are designed to protect information from
continuous and varied threats and “to demonstrate compliance with a
variety of governmental, organizational, or institutional security
requirements.”106

97. FIPS 200, supra note 72, at iv–v.
98. REVISED OMB CIRCULAR A-130, supra note 57, app. III.
99. See supra note 68 (providing background on FISMA).
100. FIPS 200, supra note 72, at 1.
101. Id. at 4.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Those tiers include Tier 1:
the Organization Level; Tier 2:
the
Mission/Business Process Level; and Tier 3: the Information System Level. From Tiers
1 to 3, the risks involved move from strategic in nature to tactical. SP 800-53, supra note
96, at 7 (explaining, in detail, the organization and structure of security controls).
105. Id. at vi (allowing “organizations to tailor the relevant security control
baseline so that it more closely aligns with their mission and business requirements
and environments of operations”).
106. Id. at 4 (stating that the controls are also established to “protect information
and information systems from traditional and advanced persistent threats in varied
operational, environmental, and technical scenarios”).
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SP 800-53 establishes eighteen baseline security control families,
with most families reflecting the FIPS 200 specifications for minimum
security requirements.107 Distinct from the security specifications
under FIPS 200 is the Program Management security control family
under SP 800-53. The Program Management family differs in its
application, as it is applied on an organization-wide basis and not at a
particular tier or in accordance with a particular level of risk.108
Within each security control family are a range of baseline security
controls which are prescribed to assure adequate security. For
instance, under the Access Control family, there are up to twenty-two
possible security control baselines to be utilized.109
Each security control is described in detail under SP 800-53,
Appendix F,110 including supplemental guidance for organizations to
consider when developing and implementing such controls.111 The
security controls also include enhancements, which describe ways in
which the organization can increase the functionality, specificity, and
strength of a control.112 The enhancements are layered on top of
baseline security controls as necessary to add functionality or
specificity to a control and increase the strength of a control in order
to meet increasing levels of risk.113 Thus, where a baseline security
control may address a low level of risk, an enhancement may be
necessary to address a moderate level of risk, and additional
enhancements may be necessary to address a high level of risk.

107. Id. app. D tbl.D-2. The baseline security control families are “Access
Control,” “Awareness and Training,” “Audit and Accountability,” “Security
Assessment and Authorization,” “Configuration Management,” “Contingency
Planning,” “Identification and Authentication,” “Incident Response,” “Maintenance,”
“Media Protection,” “Physical and Environmental Protection,” “Planning,”
“Personnel Security,” “Risk Assessment,” “System and Services Acquisition,” “System
and Communications Protection,” “System and Information Integrity,” and “Program
Management.” Id.
108. Id. apps. D tbl.D-2, G.
109. For example, the “Access Control” family contains the following security
control baselines: “Access Control Policy and Procedures,” “Account Management,”
“Access Enforcement,” “Information Flow Enforcement,” “Separation of Duties,”
“Least Privilege,” “Unsuccessful Logon Attempts,” “System Use Notification,”
“Previous Logon (Access) Notification,” “Concurrent Session Control,” “Session
Lock,” “Session Termination,” “Permitted Actions without Identification or
Authentication,” “Security Attributes,” “Remote Access,” “Wireless Access,” “Access
Control for Mobile Devices,” “Use of External Information Systems,” “Information
Sharing,” “Publicly Accessible Content,” “Data Mining Protection,” “Access Control
Decisions,” and “Reference Monitor.” Id. app. D tbl.D-2.
110. See, e.g., id. app. F (describing the “Account Management” baseline under the
“Access Control” family and detailing the minimum enhancements required for each
of the three risk-tiers).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 12.
113. Id.
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The most recent revision to SP 800-53 was released in April 2013
and aimed to tackle “the expanding threat space,” featuring “the
increasing sophistication of cyberattacks and the operations tempo of
adversaries.”114 In response to the expanding threat space, NIST in
this most recent revision incorporated new security controls and
enhancements addressing a range of areas including “mobile and
cloud computing; . . . trustworthiness, assurance, and resiliency of
information systems; insider threat; [and] advanced persistent threat
[APT].”115 NIST also added new families of privacy controls “based
on the internationally accepted Fair Information Practice
Principles.”116 To provide organizations a means of implementing
these new and expanded families of controls, NIST in the revised SP
800-53 introduced “overlays,” which can be used, essentially, to finetune
specialized
security
plans
applicable
to
“specific
missions/business functions, environments of operation, and/or
technologies.”117 Using an overlay of these various security and
privacy controls, NIST sought in its revision “to give organizations
near real-time information that is essential for senior leaders making
ongoing risk-based decisions affecting their critical missions and
business functions.”118
Though it is reasonable for NIST to update its information security
and privacy controls, the move to implement a system of controls “to
give organizations near real-time information that is essential for
senior leaders making ongoing risk-based decisions affecting their
critical missions and business functions”119 poses a threat to
government contractors that might not be in a position to implement
such a robust system of controls, either from lack of resources,
experience, or for which establishing these components could prove
a greater cost than warranted by the benefit of doing business with
the Government.
These types of requirements, though not
unfounded, represent a rising tide in information security regulation.
Though it may help to ensure greater information security across
information and systems subject to FISMA compliance, these
requirements may increase the cost of compliance, in terms of
components and experience in deploying those components, to a

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at xv.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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degree that could force some contractors to avoid projects that call
for FISMA compliance.120
NIST acknowledges that the security control baselines “address the
security needs of a broad and diverse set of constituencies (including
individual users and organizations).”121 The baselines reflect some
underlying assumptions regarding the functions served by and the
threats posed to such information systems.122 NIST also includes
among the assumptions underlying the baselines within SP 800-53
that “[o]rganizations have the necessary structure, resources, and
infrastructure to implement the controls.”123 As analyzed in this
Article, that assumption is not always true, particularly for small
business contractors, or larger businesses that have not had to
implement information security protection as part of their prior work
with the federal government or particular federal agencies. NIST
concedes that although federal departments and agencies will easily
satisfy this assumption, it is more problematic for local governments
and small businesses.124 The size of those entities and availability of
resources may inhibit their ability to meet the minimum baseline
requirements.125 Presumably, if a small business contractor or
another similarly situated organization lacks the resources necessary
to provide the required range of security capabilities, it will ultimately
have to avoid any work that calls for the application of security
controls that are beyond its capacity or experience.
Among the new security controls are a series of controls prescribed
under the program management family, including an insider threat
program, an information security workforce, and testing, training,
and monitoring security control.126 In addition, new security controls
are also included in other families such as the system and
communications protection family and incident response family.
120. But see Andrew George Sakallaris, Questioning the Sacred Cow: Reexamining the
Justifications for Small Business Set Asides, 36 PUB. CONT. L.J. 685, 696 (2007) (arguing
that small businesses possess advantages over large firms that allow them to better
comply with government requirements).
121. SP 800-53, supra note 96, at 29.
122. Id. (“Some assumptions that generally underlie the baselines . . . include, for
example: (i) the environments in which organizational information systems operate;
(ii) the nature of operations conducted by organizations; (iii) the functionality
employed within information systems; (iv) the types of threats facing organizations,
missions/business processes, and information systems; and (v) the type of
information processed, stored, or transmitted by information systems.”).
123. Id. at 30.
124. Id. at 30 n.64.
125. Id. (“Such entities may not be large enough or sufficiently resourced to have
elements dedicated to providing the range of security capabilities that are assumed
by the baselines. Organizations consider such factors in their risk-based decisions.”).
126. Id. app. D.
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1.

Insider threat program
The Insider Threat Program requires a specific team that handles
insider threats across multiple departments.127 Its supplemental
guidance states that “[i]nsider threat programs can leverage the
existence of incident handling teams organizations may already have
in place, such as computer security incident response teams.”128 Thus
a contractor lacking an experienced computer security incident
response team will lack one of the basic building blocks of an insider
threat program. Further, NIST highlights the importance of human
resource records in detecting malicious insider activity. Human
resources records are especially important in this effort, as
compelling evidence shows that insider crimes are sometimes
“preceded by non-technical behaviors in the workplace (e.g., ongoing
patterns of disgruntled behavior and conflicts with coworkers and
other colleagues).”129 These precursors can better inform and guide
organizational officials in more focused and targeted monitoring
efforts.130
Implementation of an Insider Threat Program poses a risk to
organizations lacking experience in addressing issues such as
disgruntled employee behavior and employee workplace disputes.
Efforts to implement this security control could expose market
participants to potential employee grievances and lawsuits based on
civil liberty violations.131 NIST appears to recognize this risk
recommending that “[t]he participation of a legal team is important
to ensure that all monitoring activities are performed in accordance
with appropriate legislation, directives, regulations, policies,
standards, and guidelines.”132 With that said, however, it is difficult to
know whether existing legislation, regulations, or policies even
address the types of employee behaviors that might signal an insider
threat. Thus, implementing the Insider Threat Program security
control, while addressing some risks, actually creates new ones
specific to certain types of organizations.

127. Id. app. G.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See, e.g., Raquel Aldana-Pindell, The 9/11 “National Security” Cases: Three
Principles Guiding Judges’ Decision-Making, 81 OR. L. REV. 985, 990 n.22 (2002) (noting
that the Inspector General has the authority to review alleged civil liberties violations
of federal employees).
132. SP 800-53, supra note 96, app. G.
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2.

Information security workforce
Another new security control in the Program Management family is
the Information Security Workforce under which an organization
must establish an “information security workforce development and
improvement program.”133 Such programs must specify the requisite
knowledge and experience and the standards for further developing
skills necessary for performing certain security functions.134 This is a
security control reasonably related to assuring adequate information
security. Again, however, organizations entering the market, or
without an employee base possessing the knowledge and skills
necessary to satisfy information security requirements, run the risk of
falling behind established competitors that are better equipped to
satisfy the necessary knowledge and skills.
3.

Testing, training, and monitoring
NIST also prescribes the Testing, Training, and Monitoring
security control. Under this control, an organization must develop,
maintain, and execute a process to test, train, and monitor its
information systems.135 As the significance of constant monitoring
continues to increase, so does the need to coordinate and consolidate
organization-wide testing and monitoring of security controls.136
4.

Security controls in other families
a.

System and communications protection family

New security controls were established in other families as well.
For example, NIST recommended the Operations Security (OPSEC)
baseline security control under the System and Communications
Protection family. This control calls for development of an OPSEC
program, which would be created to “den[y] adversaries access to

133. Id.
134. Id. (noting that the “programs include, for example, (i) defining the
knowledge and skill levels needed to perform information security duties and tasks;
(ii) developing role-based training programs for individuals assigned information
security roles and responsibilities; and (iii) providing standards for measuring and
building individual qualifications for incumbents and applicants for information
security-related positions”).
135. Id.
136. Id. (clarifying that “[w]ith the increasing importance of continuous
monitoring programs, the selection and implementation of security across the three
tiers of the risk management hierarchy, and the widespread use of common controls,
organizations need to coordinate and consolidate the host of testing and monitoring
that are routinely conducted as part of ongoing organizational assessments
supporting a variety of security controls”).
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information about capabilities and intentions.”137 To accomplish this,
organizations would identify, control, and protect unclassified
information related to planning and sensitive activities.138 Developing
an OPSEC program requires distinguishing critical information,
analyzing threats and vulnerabilities, assessing risks, and taking
proper countermeasures.139 Again, the extent to which certain newer
or small business government contractors get involved in managing
federal information or information systems, it is not clear whether
they would have the expertise to develop a compliant OPSEC
Program.140
Another new set of security controls that falls under the System and
Communications Protection family includes Concealment and
Misdirection, Honeyclients, Distributed Processing and Storage, Outof-Band Channels, Operations Security, Process Isolation, and
Wireless Link Protection.141 Implementation of these controls
arguably requires a degree of sophistication and investment in
infrastructure that could threaten to keep small businesses or newer
market entrants from complying with these requirements.
For instance, Concealment and Misdirection calls for entities to use
techniques to reduce the targeting capabilities of potential
adversaries by purposely confusing and misleading them.142 An
example provided by NIST is the use of “virtualization techniques
[to] provide organizations with the ability to disguise information
systems, potentially reducing the likelihood of successful attacks
without the cost of having multiple platforms.”143 Although this is
presented as a cost-effective risk mitigation measure, organizations
that lack the sophistication to employ virtualization techniques may
indeed have to rely upon, and incur the additional costs of, multiple
platforms.144 Other techniques NIST suggests include employing
137. Id. app. F.
138. See id.
139. Id.
140. But see Sakallaris, supra note 120, at 689 (arguing that designing contract
procurement requirements to specifically benefit small businesses goes against the
most basic principles of government contracting).
141. SP 800-53, supra note 96, app. D.
142. Id. app. F.
143. Id.
144. Explanation of Virtualization to a Non-Techie Person, I-EVOLVE TECH. SERVICES (Nov.
10, 2009), http://blog.i-evolve.com/explaination-of-virtualization (“Virtualization is the
creation of a virtual (rather than actual) version of something, such as an operating
system, a server, a storage device or network resources . . . . Network virtualization is a
method of combining the available resources in a network by splitting up the available
bandwidth into channels, each of which is independent from the others, and each of
which can be assigned (or reassigned) to a particular server or device in real time. The
idea is that virtualization disguises the true complexity of the network by separating it
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randomness, uncertainty, and virtualization to confuse and mislead
adversaries.145 Though these sound like viable means of mitigating
adversaries’ advances, the techniques need to be employed by
experienced personnel.146 An organization without access to these
personnel would likely be rendered less competitive for its inability to
employ concealment and misdirection programs.
Finally, the Distributed Processing and Storage baseline calls for
spreading processing and storage resources across multiple physical
locations.147 This creates redundancy for organizations, which in turn
increases the work required for adversaries to succeed in interfering
with the organization’s information systems.148 The requirement to
establish multiple physical locations would affect small businesses
and, possibly, new market entrants lacking the infrastructure
necessary to distribute processing and storage. Again, all of these
requirements exemplify how certain cybersecurity regulations would
burden small businesses and strain their resources. The regulations
may also pose either a prohibitive costs or risk to larger, more
established businesses that are just starting to work with the federal
government or a new agency.
b.

Incident response family

Further, the Information Spillage Response control was established
under another family, the incident response family.149 Properly
responding to an information spill does not at first glance appear to
require extensive additional skills.150 The types of information spills
contemplated under Information Spillage Response, however, could
make instituting this security control difficult.151 The issue with this
type of information spillage is that information is being categorized
differently now than it was just a few years ago. For example,

into manageable parts, much like [a] partitioned hard drive makes it easier to manage
[] files.”); see also Amy Newman, Virtualization Technologies Lure Governments,
SERVERWATCH (July 28, 2010), http://www.serverwatch.com/virtualization/article.php/
3895516/Virtualization-Technologies-Lure-Governments.htm (explaining that the high
costs of implementing virtualization technologies is a common deterrent).
145. SP 800-53, supra note 96, app. F.
146. See Newman, supra note 144 (noting that half of those surveyed believed their
IT staff were not experienced enough to manage other virtualization techniques).
147. SP 800-53, supra note 96, app. F.
148. Id.
149. Id. app. D.
150. Id. app. F (listing the reporting and reparation steps that must be taken when
information has already been leaked).
151. Id. (mentioning situations in which the sensitivity of information either
increases over time or is underestimated when initially introduced to a specific
information system).
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initiatives such as the movement to CUI152 from former categories
such as “For Official Use Only” or “Sensitive But Unclassified” present
the risk that information that once may have been considered not to
be sensitive has moved to a category of higher sensitivity.153
According to the supplemental guidance under Information Spillage
Response, such official and unofficial re-categorizations constitute
information spillages requiring corrective action.154 In an age in
which information categorization is in flux, this new security control
presents the potential for frequent information spillage. The
Information Spillage Response control may need to be monitored to
ensure it is not becoming a burdensome requirement that serves to
capture only the most recent changes in information categories.
Only then will such a security control work as an effective tool for
information security.
III. PROPOSED UPDATES TO FISMA
A. The Federal Information Security Amendments Acts of 2012 and 2013
In April 2012, the House of Representatives passed a bill to update
FISMA, titled the “Federal Information Security Amendments Act of
2012” (2012 Amendments).155 The bill did not pass in the Senate,156
but it provides insight into congressional intent to update FISMA
requirements. The legislation was re-introduced in 2013 as the
“Federal Information Security Amendments Act of 2013” and once
again passed the House of Representatives (2013 Amendments).157
Key among the proposed updates was the Amendments’158 emphasis
on continuous monitoring. One of the stated purposes of the
Amendments was to “provide a mechanism for improved oversight of
Federal agency information security programs and systems through a
focus on automated and continuous monitoring of agency
152. See, for example, DFARS Case 2011-D039, stating that the Department of
Defense Federal Acquisition Supplement (DFARS) does not presently address the
safeguarding of unclassified information, and “addresses the safeguarding
requirements specified in Executive Order 13556, Controlled Unclassified
Information.” Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement: Safeguarding
Unclassified DoD Information (DFARS Case 2011-D039), 76 Fed. Reg. 38,089,
38,089–90 (proposed June 29, 2011) (to be codified at FAR pts. 204, 252).
153. Exec. Order No. 13,556, 3 C.F.R. 267 (2011) (consolidating certain unclassified
designations into one category called “Controlled Unclassified Information”).
154. SP 800-53, supra note 96, app. F.
155. Federal Information Security Amendments Act of 2012, H.R. 4257, 112th Cong..
156. Cybersecurity and Internet Freedom Act of 2011, S. 413, 112th Cong..
157. Federal Information Security Amendments Act of 2013, H.R. 1163, 113th Cong..
158. Unless otherwise specified, reference to “Amendments” means both the 2012
and 2013 Amendments.
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information systems and regular threat assessments.”159
The
Amendments define “automated and continuous monitoring” as
“monitoring, with minimal human involvement, through an
uninterrupted, ongoing real time or near real-time process used to
determine if the complete set of planned, required, and deployed
security controls within an information system continue to be
effective over time with rapidly changing information technology and
threat development.”160
The Amendments call for deploying automated and continuous
monitoring as part of minimum agency security operations
requirements, and propose to task the Chief Information Officer
(CIO) or Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) with overseeing
and maintaining those automated monitoring systems.161
Further, the Amendments call for requiringagencies to develop
information security programs and procedures for operations and
assets supporting the agency, including those provided by contractors
similar to those required for the agencies themselves.162 The
information and security programs and procedures will, if passed,
require contractors and others to ensure oversight and training of
their information security professionals with a very demanding level
of frequency.163
The requirements of the proposed Amendments appear consistent
in their application of automated and continuous monitoring
requirements. They call for procedures, training, and programs that
all address these new requirements. Further, they reasonably call for
each agency’s CIO to coordinate with outside security centers when
handling information incidents that are beyond the agency’s
control.164 It is sensible that Congress seeks collaboration between
159. H.R. 1163 § 2 (amending 44 U.S.C. § 3551(a)); H.R. 4257 § 2 (same).
160. H.R. 1163 § 2 (amending 44 U.S.C. § 3552(b)(2)); H.R. 4257 § 2 (same).
161. H.R. 1163 § 2 (amending 44 U.S.C. § 355a(a)(3) and specifying that the CIO
or CISO would be responsible for managing system intrusions and vulnerabilities and
for holding officials responsible for keeping information secure); H.R. 4257 § 2
(same).
162. H.R. 1163 § 2 (amending 44 U.S.C. § 3554(b)(1) and noting that such
systems would be required to include “automated and continuous monitoring, when
possible, of the risk and magnitude of the harm that could result from the disruption
or unauthorized access, use, disclosure, modification, or destruction of information
and information systems that support the operations and assets of the agency”); H.R.
4257 § 2 (same).
163. H.R. 1163 § 2 (amending 44 U.S.C. § 3554(b)(4) and requiring oversight and
training “with a frequency sufficient to support risk-based security decisions,
automated and continuous monitoring, when possible, for testing and evaluation of
the effectiveness and compliance of information security policies, procedures, and
practices”); H.R. 4257 § 2 (same).
164. H.R. 1163 § 2 (amending 44 U.S.C. § 3554(a)(3)(A)(iv)); H.R. 4257 § 2
(same).
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agencies and their contractors to ensure that automated and
continuous monitoring requirements are deployed appropriately so
that proper levels of information security protection are maintained.
Again, however, it is not clear how the implementation of
automated and continuous monitoring requirements may affect
prospective small business contractors or those new to FISMA
compliance requirements. It may be that organizations do not have
the necessary resources and experience to deploy and consistently
administer the requisite technology called for in ensuring automated
and continuous monitoring. Further, the requirement to report
security incidents to the Inspector General (IG) within twenty-four to
forty-eight hours of discovery could have a chilling effect on these
contractors,165 because reporting could open them up to liability.
Though reporting to an IG is no doubt a necessity to ensure
information security is handled appropriately, it may be enough to
prevent certain contractors, particularly those concerned about
potential criminal liability arising from a security breach, from
engaging in contracts that require information security.
B. Executive Order on Cybersecurity Protections of Critical Infrastructure
The 2012 Amendments, like most other significant cybersecurityrelated166 legislation, failed to pass in the 112th Congress. Following
Congress’s failure to pass cybersecurity legislation, President Obama
issued an Executive Order (“the Order”), Improving Critical

165. 44 U.S.C. 3554(a)(3)(A)(v) (2006).
166. Among the higher-profile bills failing passage was the Cybersecurity Act of
2012, S. 2105, 112th Cong.. The bill, with backing in the Senate and the White
House, provided for increased government oversight of private networks in the
nation’s critical infrastructure. Under the Act, the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) would determine which businesses would fall under critical
infrastructure, but it would generally include sectors such as electric grids, water
systems, and transportation. The Cybersecurity Act would have required the federal
government to develop a comprehensive acquisition risk management strategy. The
focus, like the FISMA Amendments Act, would call for automated and continuous
monitoring of agency information systems and regular threat assessments, and DHS
would have authority to streamline agency reporting requirements. Another
proposed bill was the SECURE IT Act (short for Strengthening and Enhancing
Cybersecurity Using Research, Education, Information and Technology Act). S.
3342, 112th Cong. (2012). Under SECURE IT, businesses would have been allowed
to voluntarily share cyberthreat information. SECURE IT included provisions that
limited liability for companies taking steps to protect their networks and restrictions
on the types of information to be shared so as to protect personal privacy. Further,
SECURE IT would have reformed federal cybersecurity standards, directing the
Secretary of Commerce to issue policies and guidance governing agency
cybersecurity. DHS would have been tasked with conducting ongoing security
analyses and developing a timeline for establishing continuous monitoring of federal
networks.
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Infrastructure Cybersecurity, which was intended to address
cybersecurity threats to the nation’s critical infrastructure.167
Broadly defining the term “critical infrastructure,”168 the Order
places an emphasis on cybersecurity information sharing, calling for
processes and systems to be developed that make it possible for the
private sector and government agencies to share information about
cyberthreats and to ensure that organizations that are under threat of
a cyberattack are informed of such a threat.169 The Order also directs
the development of a cybersecurity framework, which will “include a
set of standards, methodologies, procedures, and processes that align
policy, business, and technological approaches to address cyber
risks.”170 This framework, which will be developed by NIST under the
direction of the Secretary of Commerce,171 will be similar to the
development of FISMA implementation standards in that it will be
risk-based in nature and “technology neutral” in order to enable
technical innovation and account for organizational differences. As
with other sections of the Order, private sector companies and
organizations are expected to be involved in development of the
framework by participating in a public notice and comment
process.172 From this standpoint, it appears that NIST will consider
the needs of small businesses and larger new market entrants before
finalizing the Cybersecurity Framework.
Another provision of the Order, however, could operate to bar
small businesses and new government contractors from commenting
on issues pertaining to cybersecurity. Under the provision, the
Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of General Services must
recommend the “feasibility, security benefits, and relative merits of
incorporating security standards into acquisition planning and
contract administration.”173

167. Exec. Order No. 13,636, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,737 (Feb. 19, 2013).
168. Id. at 11,739. Critical infrastructure is defined as “systems and assets, whether
physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of
such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national
economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those
matters.” 42 U.S.C. § 5195c(e) (Supp. IV 2011).
169. Exec. Order No. 13,636, 78 Fed. Reg. at 11,739, 11,742.
170. Id. at 11,740–41.
171. Id. (noting that the Framework is to be “consistent with voluntary
international standards when such international standards will advance the objectives
of this order, and shall meet the requirements of the National Institute of Standards
and Technology Act, as amended, the National Technology Transfer and
Advancement Act of 1995, and OMB Circular A-119, as revised” (citations omitted)).
172. Id. at 11,741.
173. Id.
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This effort could compound the relative inexperience or lack of
resources of small businesses or even larger businesses seeking to do
business with the federal government. These entities may already be
at a competitive disadvantage through their inability to comply with
evolving cybersecurity standards.174 If a new set of security standards
are incorporated into acquisition planning and contract
administration, small businesses, or new market entrants may be
further disadvantaged if they cannot satisfy these recommended
standards. It is possible that the effects of the new standards may not
be so severe, as the Report must “address what steps can be taken to
harmonize and make consistent existing procurement requirements
related to cybersecurity.”175 But, if the DoD and GSA determine that
security standards must be significantly overhauled in acquisition
planning and contract administration, no amount of harmonization
will help small businesses or new market entrants.
Section 6 of the Order, which requires the Secretary of Homeland
Security to establish a “consultative process,” could possibly
exacerbate the problem.176 Section 6 directs the Secretary to use the
Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council (CIPAC) to
facilitate information from Sector Coordinating Councils (SCC) and
critical infrastructure owners and operators, as well as other
government agencies.177
Therefore, existing private sector
organizations that are already part of CIPAC,178 and those already
174. See supra Part II.B (discussing the updated security controls under SP 800-53
issued by NIST).
175. See supra Part II.B.
176. Exec. Order No. 13,636, 78 Fed. Reg. at 11,740.
177. Id.
178. CIPAC is a partnership between the government and critical
infrastructure/key resources (CI/KR) owners created by DHS to “facilitate an
effective defense of our Nation’s critical infrastructure” through collaboration of all
key stakeholders. Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council, 71 Fed. Reg.
14,930, 14,930, 14,932 (Mar. 24, 2006) (notice). CIPAC membership is structured
around “critical infrastructure sectors” initially designated by Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7) and expanded upon by DHS. See id. at 14,932–33
(noting fifteen sectors outlined in HSPD-7 and DHS’ authority to form new sectors);
Council Members, Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council, DEP’T OF HOMELAND
SEC., http://www.dhs.gov/council-members-critical-infrastructure-partnership-advisorycouncil (last visited June 10, 2013) [hereinafter Council Members] (listing the twenty
current sectors). Each critical infrastructure sector is composed of (1) a government
coordinating council (GCC) consisting of a lead Federal agency and “all relevant
Federal, state, local, tribal, and/or territorial government agencies;” and (2) a sector
coordinating council (SCC)—independent and self-governed bodies comprised of
private sector players or their representatives.
The Critical Infrastructure
Partnership Advisory Council, 77 Fed. Reg. 64,818, 64,819 (Oct. 23, 2012)
(membership update). The roster of CIPAC membership is published on the CIPAC
website. Council Members, supra. HSPD-7 was revoked by a presidential policy
directive issued the same day as the Order. Directive on Critical Infrastructure
Security and Resilience, Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-21, 2013 DAILY COMP.
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participating in SCCs likely have a seat at the table in discussing the
relative merits of incorporating security standards into acquisition
planning and contract administration. This arrangement could
threaten to deprive small businesses and new market entrants of the
opportunity to share concerns about a potential competitive
imbalance that the incorporation of the security standards might
bring.
Another related requirement that might also affect small
businesses and new market entrants is Presidential Policy Directive
(PPD-21), Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience.179 PPD-21
was issued the same day as the Executive Order and serves as a
companion of sorts, clarifying the “policy of the United States to
strengthen the security and resilience of its critical infrastructure
against both physical and cyber threats.”180 Paragraph 6 of PPD-21
requires the General Services Administration to coordinate with
other agencies, including the DoD and DHS to “provide or support
government-wide contracts for critical infrastructure systems and
ensure that such contracts include audit rights for the security and
resilience of critical infrastructure.”181 It is not yet known what audit
rights GSA and other agencies might seek to include in critical
infrastructure systems contracts. The possibility that certain contracts
will expressly include audit rights may chill small businesses or other
inexperienced contractors from competing for critical infrastructure
systems contracts. A compliance requirement may prove daunting
enough to some contractors, but the express right of the government
to audit compliance undoubtedly compounds a contractor’s
compliance risk. Though the audit rights established under PPD-21
will help foster security of critical infrastructure, they could prove to
thin the market of businesses that might otherwise compete for
critical infrastructure systems contracts.
The provisions of the Order, like those of the failed cybersecurity
legislation preceding it, are helpful because they provide insight into
the thoughts of policy makers who are in the process of enacting
official policy requirements and standards.
The effects and
consequences of these policies and standards will be felt by the
government contracting sector, especially those members of the
sector that are small or inexperienced and lack the resources to
PRES. DOC. 1 (Feb. 12, 2013) [hereinafter PPD-21]. As stated in the directive,
however, “[p]lans developed pursuant to HSPD-7 shall remain in effect until
specifically revoked or superseded.” Id. at 10.
179. PPD-21, supra note 178.
180. Id. at 1.
181. Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
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establish and maintain robust cybersecurity and information security
protections. These changes may also affect larger businesses that
possess more resources, but may view the new standards as too much
of a compliance risk to justify the effort to do business with the
federal government or a new federal agency.
C. Development of CUI Requirements
The development of information security requirements has evolved
with technology. As the capability to access, handle, store, process,
and utilize information has increased in the federal government,
more comprehensive security measures have been developed to
guard against unauthorized access, use, and distribution of
information.
The scope of what information needs protection has evolved as
well. In recent years, efforts to better define, utilize, and ensure the
protection of CUI in the federal government have taken large strides.
A key moment in the development of CUI was President Obama’s
issuance of Executive Order 13,556.182 The Executive Order created
an “open and uniform program” for managing CUI—information
that requires safeguarding or dissemination controls pursuant to and
consistent with law, regulations, and Government-wide policies.183
The Executive Order addressed a system characterized by “executive
departments and [agencies] employ[ing] ad hoc, agency-specific
policies, procedures, and markings to safeguard and control
[CUI].”184 Much of the unclassified information safeguarded under
the existing system, characterized in the Order as a “confusing
patchwork [that] has resulted in inconsistent marking and
safeguarding of documents,” was known as Sensitive But Unclassified
(SBU).185 One particular concern noted in the Order was that
agency-specific policies for information safeguarding were “often
hidden from public view.”186 This only aggravated the inconsistent
marking and safeguarding practices, called for “unnecessarily
restrictive dissemination policies, and created impediments to
authorized information sharing.”187
182. Exec. Order No. 13,556, 3 C.F.R. 267 (2011)..
183. Id. The definition of CUI excludes information that is classified under
Executive Order 13,526 or the Atomic Energy Act. Id.
184. Id. Executive Order 13,556 provided the following examples of CUI:
“information that involves privacy, security, proprietary business interests, and law
enforcement investigations.” Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
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To address these issues, the Order established a program for
managing all unclassified information in the Executive Branch that
required safeguarding or dissemination controls.188 President Obama
designated the National Archives and Records Administration
(NARA) as the executive agent (EA) for developing, implementing,
and managing the CUI Program.189 Guidance issued by NARA (“CUI
Office Notice”), under its authority pursuant to the Order, requires
the designation of CUI information to fall under agency-developed
categories and subcategories.190 The CUI Office Notice also requires
“safeguarding measures and controls to protect CUI from
unauthorized access, and to manage the risks associated with the
processing,” handling, and storage.191
These designations were developed into an initial public registry of
fifteen CUI categories and eighty-eight subcategories in November
2011.192 A year later, the CUI Registry expanded to twenty-two
categories193 and one-hundred-and-one subcategories, illustrating the
broad scope of areas containing unclassified information in need of
safeguarding and control.194
Streamlining the manner in which CUI is safeguarded and
disseminated by creating a uniform categorization system will impact
the way in which information is shared between federal agencies and
contractors. Such a system will undoubtedly create more clarity
about what information may be disseminated. Clarity, in turn, makes
it likely that individuals with access to information will not

188. Id.
189. Id.
190. CONTROLLED UNCLASSIFIED INFO. OFFICE, NAT’L ARCHIVES, CONTROLLED
UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION (CUI) NOTICE 2011-01: INITIAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE
FOR EXECUTIVE ORDER 13556, at 1–2, 7 (2011), available at http://www.archives.gov/cui/
documents/2011-cuio-notice-2011-01-initial-guidance.pdf.
191. Id. at 4.
192. CONTROLLED UNCLASSIFIED INFO. OFFICE, NAT’L ARCHIVES, 2011 REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT (2011); Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI): The CUI Registry Is Out!, DATA
CLASSIFICATION (Nov. 14, 2011), http://www.dataclassification.com/en/component/
k2/item/191-controlled-unclassified-informationcui-the-cui-registry-is-out; CUI Registry,
NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://www.archives.gov/cui/registry/category-list.html#categories
(last visited June 11, 2013).
193. The current CUI registry categories consist of the following: (1) Agriculture;
(2) Copyright; (3) Critical Infrastructure; (4) Emergency Management; (5) Export
Control; (6) Financial; (7) Foreign Government Information; (8) Geodetic Product
Information; (9) Immigration; (10) Information Systems Vulnerability Information;
(11) Intelligence; (12) Law Enforcement; (13) Legal; (14) North Atlantic Treaty
Organization; (15) Nuclear; (16) Patent; (17) Privacy; (18) Proprietary; (19) SAFETY
Act Information; (20) Statistical; (21) Tax; and (22) Transportation. CUI Registry,
supra note 192.
194. See id. (listing the 101 broad subcategories).
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unreasonably withhold information because the propriety of sharing
the information will be easily ascertained.
As already seen after one year, however, the number of categories
and subcategories is prone to proliferation.195 This may call into
question the accuracy of information categorized under a particular
category or subcategory. Suppose a new category or subcategory is
established that creates a better home for previously designated
information. Whether the government is required to re-categorize
the already designated information is unclear.
Moreover, if
information designated under a particular category or subcategory
more appropriately falls under a new category or subcategory
established subsequently, how is it to be treated? Will it have to be recategorized? If not, how are two sets of information to be treated if
they are similar but categorized differently simply by virtue of the
passage of time?
Further, the question of how contractors will be able to comply
with these requirements remains. Will a contractor ever have to
designate certain information under a particular category or
subcategory, or protect and disseminate information in accordance
with those particular categories? If so, how will the contractor make
that determination? Further, what if the contractor involved is a
small business or a new contractor inexperienced with the types of
information in question? Will there be consequences or penalties if
the contractor fails to manage the information in accordance with
the government’s directive? Some of those questions have been
addressed under subsequent efforts by the DoD to regulate the
handling and protection of CUI, and the Federal Acquisition
Regulatory (FAR) Council to address contractor management and
protection of information systems.
D. DoD Efforts To Regulate Controlled Unclassified Information, and
Information Security in General
In addition to FISMA requirements and the federal government’s
efforts to categorize and coordinate treatment of CUI, the DoD has
taken steps to regulate contractor handling and protection of
unclassified information. For instance, as part of its Safeguarding
Unclassified DoD Information rule (DFARS Case 2011-D039), the
DoD proposed new rules under the Defense Federal Acquisition
Regulation Supplement (DFARS) that would govern contractor

195. See supra notes 192–94 and accompanying text.
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safeguarding of unclassified DoD information.196 The DoD issued the
proposed rule to “implement adequate security measures to
safeguard unclassified DoD information within contractor
information systems from unauthorized access and disclosure, and to
prescribe reporting to the DoD with regard to certain cyber intrusion
events that affect DoD information resident on or transiting through
contractor unclassified information systems.”197 Further, the DoD
explained that its proposed rule “addresse[d] the safeguarding
requirements specified in Executive Order 13556, Controlled
Unclassified Information[,]” but allowed that changes implemented
by NARA regarding CUI “may also require future DFARS revisions in
this area.”198
1. An analysis of the proposed requirements related to controlled unclassified
information in the DoD
The DFARS Case 2011-D039 proposed rule sought to create a twotiered approach through the use of basic and enhanced safeguarding
measures in order to (1) avoid disclosure of DoD information
resident on or transiting through unclassified computer networks,
(2) prevent the exfiltration of DoD information on such systems, and
(3) prescribe reporting of certain cyberintrusion events to the
DoD.199 Aside from the obvious benefit of safeguarding information,
the DoD stated an additional objective of the reporting requirements
would be to help the DoD “[a]ssess the impact of loss; [b]etter
understand methods of loss; [f]acilitate information sharing and
collaboration; and [s]tandardize procedures for tracking and
reporting intrusions.”200
The DoD sought to apply its rule on a broad scope, covering any
information already classified or defined under existing directives
and regulations, including (1) “critical program information”

196. Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement:
Safeguarding
Unclassified DoD Information, 76 Fed. Reg. 38,089, 38,089, 38,091 (proposed June
29, 2011) (to be codified at FAR pts. 204, 252).
197. Id. at 38,090.
198. Id. In fact, the DoD’s efforts to address safeguarding of unclassified
information pre-date Executive Order 13556. An advance notice of proposed
rulemaking was published in the federal register in March 2010. See Defense Federal
Acquisition Regulation Supplement: Safeguarding Unclassified Information, 75 Fed.
Reg. 9563, 9563 (proposed Mar. 3, 2010) (to be codified at FAR pts. 204, 252). The
Executive Order was published later, in November 2010. That fact notwithstanding,
the DoD clarified in its proposed rule that it was promulgated to address the
requirements of the Executive Order.
199. Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement:
Safeguarding
Unclassified DoD Information, 76 Fed. Reg. at 38,090.
200. Id.

BANCROFT.OFF_TO_WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

REGULATING INFORMATION SECURITY

7/3/2013 10:44 AM

1181

pursuant to DoD Instruction 5200.39;201 (2) “critical information”
under DoD Directive 5205.02;202 (3) information restricted under
International Traffic in Arms Regulations203 (ITAR) and Export
Administration Regulations204 (EAR); (4) information exempt
pursuant to DoD regulations regarding the Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA);205 (5) information already labeled in a way indicating
“controlled access and dissemination”;206 (6) Information considered
“technical data [or] computer software” and any technical
information identified pursuant to DoD Directives 5230.24207 and
5230.25;208 and (7) “personally identifiable information” such as

201. DEP’T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION NO. 5200.39, CRITICAL PROGRAM INFORMATION
(CPI)PROTECTION WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, at 1 (2010), available at
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/520039p.pdf.
202. DoD Directive 5205.02 created the Operations Security (OPSEC) program.
DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE NO. 5205.02E, DOD OPERATIONS SECURITY (OPSEC) PROGRAM 1
(2012), available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/520502e.pdf. The
OPSEC program involves “identifying critical information and subsequently
analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities.”
DEP’T OF DEF., JOINT PUB. NO. 1-02, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DICTIONARY OF MILITARY
AND ASSOCIATED TERMS 209 (2013), available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/
jp1_02.pdf.
203. The ITAR regulate exports of items and services that are specifically designed
for military applications, such as tanks, fighter aircraft, nerve agents, and defensive
equipment. 22 C.F.R. §§ 120–130 (2012).
204. The EAR regulate exports of commercial items that may have a potential
impact on military applications including electronics, computers, and lasers and
sensors. 15 C.F.R. §§ 730–774.
205. See DoD Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Program, 32 C.F.R. § 285
(establishing the general FOIA policy for the DoD and dictating roles and
responsibilities of the DoD components); DoD Freedom of Information Act Program
Regulation, id. § 286 (providing guidance on processing FOIA requests).
206. Some examples of such labels include “for official use only,” “sensitive but
unclassified,” “limited distribution,” “proprietary,” “originator controlled,” and “law
enforcement sensitive.” Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement:
Safeguarding Unclassified DoD Information, 76 Fed. Reg. 38,089, 38,090 (proposed
June 29, 2011) (to be codified at FAR pts. 204, 252).
207. DoD Directive 5230.24 creates a framework for marking and managing
technical documents generated or managed by defense-funded research,
development, test and evaluation programs. The scope of documents affected by the
Directive range from technical manuals and computer software to “any . . . technical
information that can be used or be adapted for use to design, engineer, produce,
manufacture, operate, repair, overhaul, or reproduce any military or space
equipment or technology concerning such equipment.” DEP’T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION
NO. 5230.24, DISTRIBUTION STATEMENTS ON TECHNICAL DOCUMENTS, 1–2 (2012),
available at http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/pdf/submit/523024p.pdf.
208. DoD Directive 5230.25 provides the policies, procedures, and responsibilities
with regard to withholding data marked under DoD Directive 5230.24 limited to
“technical data that disclose critical technology with military or space application.”
DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE NO. 5230.25, WITHHOLDING OF UNCLASSIFIED TECHNICAL
DATA FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE 1 (1995), available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/
corres/pdf/523025p.pdf.
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information covered in the Privacy Act209 and the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act210 (HIPAA).
The proposed rule would have added a definition of “DoD
information” and “nonpublic information.”211 DoD information was
defined by the proposed rule as “any nonpublic information that (1)
[h]as not been cleared for public release [under the applicable] DoD
directive . . . and (2) is [either] (i) [p]rovided by or on behalf of the
[DoD] to the Contractor or its subcontractor(s); or (ii) [c]ollected,
developed, received, transmitted, used, or stored by the Contractor
or its subcontractor(s) in support of an official DoD activity.”212 The
proposed rule also defined nonpublic information as “any
Government or third-party information that [was either] (1) . . .
exempt from disclosure under [FOIA] or otherwise protected from
disclosure by statute, Executive order or regulation; or (2)
[information that] [h]as not been disseminated to the general
public, and the Government has not yet determined whether the
information can or will be made available to the public.”213 Thus
under the rule, information would be handled in accordance with its
definition, including the new definitions for DoD information and
nonpublic information.
The rule would have established two new clauses under the DFARS.
The first clause provided for “Basic Safeguarding of Unclassified DoD
Information” by implementing “first-level protection measures.”214
The DoD stated that first-level protection measures would protect
government information and help in deterring “unauthorized
disclosure, loss, or exfiltration by employing first-level information
technology security measures.”215 These first-level security measures
would include updated virus protection and installing the latest
security software patches.216

209. The Privacy Act protects individuals from the government disclosing personal
identifying information, such as their name or social security number. Privacy Act of
1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(5), (b) (2006).
210. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified in scattered sections of 18, 26,
29, and 42 U.S.C. (2000)). HIPAA protects personal health information held by
certain entities. Understanding Health Information Privacy, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVICES, http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/index.html (last
visited June 11, 2013).
211. Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement:
Safeguarding
Unclassified DoD Information, 76 Fed. Reg. at 38,092 (revising DFARS clause
252.204-7000, Disclosure of Information).
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 38,090.
215. Id.
216. Id.
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The second clause provided for “Enhanced Safeguarding of
Unclassified DoD Information.”217 The enhanced measures would
apply to the “encryption of data for storage and transmission,
network protection and intrusion detection, and cyber intrusion
reporting.”218 The clause required a contractor to implement the
enhanced safeguarding measures in its “project, enterprise, or
company-wide unclassified information technology system(s).”219 To
satisfy the requirement, a contractor would, at a minimum, have to
comply with certain specified NIST SP 800-53 security controls under
the proposed rule.220 The DoD provided some discretion to
contracting officers in controlling the application of security controls,
allowing that “tailoring in scope and depth appropriate to the effort
may be used as authorized in the contract.”221 For those controls not
implemented, the contractor would be required to prepare a written
determination for the contracting officer explaining how the
required security control is inapplicable, or how an alternative
control or protective measure would be used to achieve equivalent
protection.222 The language appeared to provide the contracting
officer with some degree of discretion in how to apply the minimum
security controls for enhanced security. The reference, however, to
“tailoring,” indicates that the contracting officer’s discretion would
likely be limited.223 Further, enhanced security measures would
require contractor personnel to “procure and use only DoD-approved
identity authentication credentials for authentication to DoD
information systems.”224
The enhanced measures also imposed cyber-incident reporting
requirements, which would help in assessing the impact and methods
of loss, and allow for the use of that information to improve
protection. The reporting requirements called for reporting any
discovery of a “cyber-incident” to the DoD within seventy-two hours.225
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 38,094.
220. Id. (listing recommended security controls for federal information systems
and organizations under NIST SP 800-53 and dividing into the following families:
Access Control; Awareness and Training; Audit and Accountability; Configuration
Management; Contingency Planning; Identification and Authentication; Incident
Response; Maintenance, Physical and Environmental Protection; Program
Management; System and Communication Protection; and System and Information
Integrity).
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
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The proposed rule provided two examples of a “reportable cyberincident”: (1) incidents where DoD information residing on or
“transiting through” a contractor’s, or its subcontractors’, unclassified
information systems is compromised, such as through “possible data
exfiltration or manipulation”; and (2) all other incidents that allow
unauthorized access to information systems where DoD information
is located or “transiting through.”226
In preparing a cyber-incident report, the DoD was prescriptive in
the steps that contractors would be required to take to support
forensic analysis and a preliminary damage assessment. It mandated
that contractors: (1) perform “an immediate review of its unclassified
network for evidence of intrusion;” (2) review all compromised
information to specifically determine what information presented a
threat to “DoD programs, systems, or contracts, including military
programs, systems, and technology;” (3) preserve and protect any
images of compromised information systems and “monitor/packet
capture data” until the DoD determined; (4) work together with the
DoD Damage Assessment Management Office to identify any
compromised systems; and (5) “[p]rovide points of contact to
coordinate damage assessment activities.”227
The DoD required under the proposed rule that any contractor or
subcontractor involved in a cyber-incident would have to mark
attribution information reported or provided to the Government.228
It qualified that the government would be restrained in its use of the
attribution information, for instance restricting disclosure “only to
authorized persons for cyber security and related purposes.”229 The
DoD also clarified that any attribution information shared outside of
the Department would be only to those entities with a need to know
for cybersecurity and related activities, including support contractors,
but only to the extent they were subject to confidentiality
requirements.230
Nothing in the proposed clause would limit the government’s
ability to carry out its duties to further its interest in national security,
such as law enforcement and counterintelligence activities.231
Furthermore, the proposed rule authorized the use of information
226. Id.
227. Id. at 38,095.
228. Id.
229. Id. (providing the following examples as authorized purposes: forensic
analysis, incident response, compromise, or damage assessments, law enforcement,
counterintelligence, threat reporting, and trend analyses).
230. Id.
231. Id.
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derived from any of the enhanced safety measures to support “an
investigation and prosecution of any person or entity.”232
The DoD also clarified that contractors would be obligated to
coordinate with third parties to provide information that might
otherwise be barred by terms of a non-disclosure agreement (NDA).
The DoD specified that contractors would have to seek written
permission from “the owner of any third-party data believed to be
contained in images or media that may be shared with the
Government.”233 If the contractor were unable to obtain written
permission, the DoD allowed that the third-party information owner
could have the right to pursue legal action against the contractor or
its subcontractors with “access to the nonpublic information for
breach or unauthorized disclosure.”234
To the extent that some of the proposed FISMA Amendments
calling for reporting to an IG might have a chilling effect on wouldbe small businesses and other inexperienced contractors, the DoD
proposed rule would have had an even greater effect. The DoD
expressly authorized the government to seek criminal prosecution of
those seeking to “infiltrate or compromise information on a
Contractor information system.”235
Such a prosecution might
undoubtedly have affected contractor or subcontractor employees
seeking to obtain unauthorized access to their company’s systems and
information. The specter of prosecution is, of course, a powerful
deterrent. What remained unclear was how the government could
bring a criminal investigation or prosecution against the contracting
or subcontracting entity itself. Further, the DoD made clear that
contractors or subcontractors might be subject to civil liability for
breaching NDAs applying to third-party information.236 This too
could likely serve as a powerful deterrent to small businesses and
inexperienced contractors seeking to work with DoD agencies.
Adding to the burden that would be imposed under the proposed
rule, the DoD clarified that for both information security and
reporting requirements, its requirements would be supplementary
and therefore insufficient to satisfy any other information security
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Compare id. (requiring contractors to report certain cyber-security incidents to
DoD within seventy-two hours of discovery), with supra text accompanying note 165
(noting the “chilling effect” on small businesses imposed by new FISMA amendments
requiring a contractor to report security incidents to the IG within twenty-four to
forty-eight hours of discovery).
236. Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement:
Safeguarding
Unclassified DoD Information, 76 Fed. Reg. at 38,095.
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and reporting requirements.237 Thus, for the enhanced security
measures clause, the proposed rule would impose additional security
and reporting requirements.
2. The DoD’s initial regulatory flexibility analysis demonstrated the adverse
effects on small businesses
Per the requirements of the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA),238
DoD developed an Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) to
analyze the economic impact the rule would have on small entities.239
The DoD concluded as part of its analysis that first-level protection
providing for basic guard would not have a significant cost impact on
contractors because these measures “are typically employed as part of
the routine course of business.”240 This did not outweigh the
“enormous detriment” the DoD and contractor businesses might
experience in the event of a cyber-incident, either in the form of
reduced system performance, the loss of valuable information, or
both.241
A much more significant impact would be brought about by the
enhanced security protections under the proposed rule. The DoD
estimated the rule would apply to nearly 49,000, or approximately
76% of DoD’s small business contractors, as they would be required
to provide protection of DoD information at the enhanced level.242
The DoD acknowledged that “large contractors handling sensitive
information already have sophisticated information assurance
programs and can take credit for existing controls with minimal
additional cost.”243 That, the DoD stated, would not be true for most
small and mid-sized businesses with less sophisticated programs, and
which would as a result incur costs in meeting the additional
requirements.244 The DoD calculated that “a reasonable rule of
237. Id. at 38,094. More specifically, the DoD clarified that contractors would
remain responsible for safeguarding and reporting incidents affecting all other
unclassified DoD information, including Critical Program Information, Operations
Security, ITAR, Export Administration Regulations, FOIA, information described as
For Official Use Only, Sensitive But Unclassified, Limited Distribution, Proprietary,
Originator Controlled, Law Enforcement Sensitive, PII, Privacy Act, and HIPAA. Id.
238. The RFA requires a federal agency to prepare an Initial Regulatory Flexibility
Analysis if it determines that a proposed rule could have an impact on a substantial
number of small entities. Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C. § 603(a) (2006).
239. Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement:
Safeguarding
Unclassified DoD Information, 76 Fed. Reg. at 38,090.
240. Id. First-level protective measures include updated virus protection, security
patch updates, etc. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 38,091.
243. Id.
244. Id.

BANCROFT.OFF_TO_WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

REGULATING INFORMATION SECURITY

7/3/2013 10:44 AM

1187

thumb for small businesses is that information technology security
costs are approximately 0.5% of total revenues. Because there are
economies of scale when it comes to information security, larger
businesses generally pay only a fraction of that estimated cost as a
percentage of total revenue.”245
The DoD in its IRFA summary did not indicate whether it
calculated the prospective costs that small business contractors might
incur in the event they had to defend against potential civil or
criminal prosecution arising from reports and compelled third-party
information sharing necessitated as part of its cyber reporting
obligations. As with the basic costs of information security, large
businesses would enjoy economies of scale compared to small
businesses in such cases. Small businesses would no doubt incur
significantly more relative cost in defending against prosecution or
civil suits arising from cyber-incidents. Consequently, the DoD’s
IRFA summary made clear that if its proposed rule were to be
finalized, the rising tide of cybersecurity would indeed have an
immense effect on a significant portion of its small business
contractors.
The DoD solicited comments on the proposed rule, and certain
responses highlighted the increased burden that the rule would
impose. For example, the National Defense Industrial Association246
(NDIA) pointed out that the proposed rule would “conflict with the
existing CUI guidance and fundamental principles of the CUI
Executive Order,” by extending the “safeguarding and dissemination
controls to non-sensitive information.”247 This would “impede
information sharing by omitting ‘risk’ as the primary determinate for
applying safeguards.”248 To further illustrate the issue, the NDIA
noted that though the “identified subset of NIST SP 800-53 standards
and controls improve clarity and consistency, they are not risk-based
and as such, pose an unnecessary and unjustified burden on the
industry.”249 Essentially, the prescriptive approach imposed under

245. Id.
246. See About Us: Who We Are—What We Offer, NAT’L DEF. INDUS. ASS’N,
http://www.ndia.org/AboutUs/Pages/default.aspx (last visited June 11, 2013)
(explaining that NDIA is a defense industry association that lobbies and coordinates
with the federal government).
247. Letter from Major Gen. Barry Bates, Vice President, Nat’l Def. Indus. Ass’n,
to Julian Thrash, Office of Under Sec’y of Def. for Acquisition, Tech, & Logistics,
Dep’t of Def. 2 (Dec. 14, 2011) [hereinafter NDIA Comment Letter], available at
http://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?objectId=0900006480f839f0&disposition
=attachment&contentType=pdf.
248. Id.
249. Id.
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the DoD’s proposed rule would supersede the risk-based method of
applying SP 800-53 security controls under FISMA.250
Under the DoD’s prescribed rule, not only were contractors
prevented from undertaking a risk-based analysis to ascertain the
appropriate application of security controls, contracting officers were
also restricted in the discretion they could apply in accepting
alternative security measures in the place of the SP 800-53 controls.251
The NDIA also refuted the DoD’s assumptions that most Defense
Industrial Base (DIB) contractors already have systems in place that
comply with NIST SP 800-53 and that imposing the requirements
would impose a minimal cost. Based on their experience and
subcontracting relationships with small businesses, NDIA argues that
DIB small business contractors would have to incur a considerable
cost because most do not have “NIST controls in place and are underresourced.”252
NDIA proposed, instead, establishing an objective standard for riskbased safeguards, and allowing the contractor flexibility in achieving
that standard.253 Within the NDIA proposal, while the sponsoring
government agency has discretion to audit individual contractor’s
safeguards based on risk, the default position would be to allow
contractors to demonstrate that they meet the standard.254
The NDIA pointed out from experience the reality that
cybersecurity regulation could have a disproportionate effect on
small businesses and inexperienced contractors unfamiliar with the
application of security controls within the FISMA context.255 The cost
of implementing the infrastructure, hiring personnel experienced
with the high level of information security necessary to ensure
compliance, and having the wherewithal to work with the DoD in the
event of a cyberintrusion could all prove to be prohibitive to a
number of small businesses and new market entrants.

250. See id. (“Proper selection and application of the NIST SP 800-53 controls
must be driven by the sensitivity of the information and the impact of compromise or
loss. Such a correlation is absent, or at least not apparent, in the rule’s selection of
this particular subset of NIST SP 800-53 controls and tables.”).
251. Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement:
Safeguarding
Unclassified DoD Information, 76 Fed. Reg. 38,089, 38,094 (proposed June 29, 2011)
(to be codified at FAR pts. 204, 252) (“[T]ailoring in scope and depth appropriate to
the effort may be used as authorized in the contract”).
252. NDIA Comment Letter, supra note 247, at 2.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
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E. Efforts To Provide For Information Security Through the Federal
Procurement System
In August 2012, the Department of Defense, the GSA and NASA
proposed a new rule to update the FAR, which prescribed Basic
Safeguarding of Contractor Information Systems.256 The proposed
rule, issued as FAR Case 2011-020, requires a set of safeguards for
government contractor information systems that contain or process
non-public information provided by or generated for the
government.257 The safeguards are required to address a number of
basic information security requirements.258
The safeguards are new protections under the FAR. They are
being prescribed pursuant to a newly proposed FAR subpart 4.17,
Basic Safeguarding of Contractor Information Systems,259 and applied
under a new FAR clause by the same name to be incorporated into all
federal contracts under which a contractor’s information system may
“contain information provided by or generated for the Government
(other than public information).”260 The new FAR clause is intended
to be widely applied, even allowing contracting officers discretion to
apply the safeguarding requirements at levels under the relatively low
dollar-value simplified acquisition threshold261 when inclusion is
determined to be appropriate.
1.

Analysis of the Proposed Basic Information Security Requirements
Similar to the DoD proposed rule, this proposed rule does not
apply to public information, which an agency “discloses, disseminates,
or makes available to the public.”262 It instead applies to information,
256. Federal Acquisition Regulation:
Basic Safeguarding of Contractor
Information Systems, 77 Fed. Reg. 51,496 (proposed Aug. 24, 2012) (to be codified
at FAR pts. 4, 7, 12, 42, 52).
257. Id. at 51,497.
258. See id. at 51,499 (including the restriction of information; protection of
electronic, voice, and fax transmissions; apply minimum physical and electronic
security requirements; ensure sanitization of media used for processing information;
applying intrusion protection such as anti-virus, spyware, and software patches; and
limiting transfers to subcontractors needing information necessary for contract
performance).
259. Id. at 51,498.
260. Id.
261. The simplified acquisition threshold is $150,000. See Federal Acquisition
Information: Inflation Adjustment of Acquisition-Related Threshold, 75 Fed. Reg.
53,129, 53,130 (Aug. 30, 2010) (to be codified at FAR pts. 1–3, 5–8, 12–13, 15–17, 19,
22–23, 28, 32, 36, 42, 50, 52).
262. Compare Federal Acquisition Regulation: Basic Safeguarding of Contractor
Information Systems, 77 Fed. Reg. at 51,497–98 (citing 44 U.S.C. § 3502 (2006))
(stating the applicability of the proposed rule does not cover public information),
with Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement: Safeguarding Unclassified
DoD Information, 76 Fed. Reg. 38,089, 38,091–92 (proposed June 29, 2011) (to be
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defined by the Committee on National Security Systems Instruction
4009 as “any communication or representation of knowledge such as
facts, data, or opinions in any medium or form, including textual,
numerical, graphic, cartographic, narrative, or audiovisual.”263
The DoD, GSA, and NASA expressly stated that the requirements
proposed in the rule are “an extension of the requirements, under
[FISMA], for Federal agencies to provide information security for
information and information systems that support the operations and
assets of the agency, including those managed by contractors.”264 The
proposed rule expressly applies to subcontractors as well.265
Under the proposed rule, a contractor must apply basic
safeguarding requirements to protect applicable information.266 The
basic requirements are a mix of prescriptive minimum safeguards, as
well as more broadly worded references to “best” levels of security.
For instance, the basic safeguarding procedures for protecting
information on public computers or Web sites require a contractor to
process the applicable information on non-public computers or
computers that have access control and to only post information on
websites that restrict public access.267 The requirement is very
prescriptive, stating a clear prohibition on the use of public
computers lacking access control, but allowing for the posting of
information to websites that control access by user ID and password
or user certificates, among other security technologies.268
In
transmitting electronic information, however, the requirements are
more broadly stated in that when such information is transmitted,
technology and processes that “provide the best level of security and
privacy available” satisfy the basic safeguarding requirements.269

codified at FAR pts. 204, 252) (explaining that the scope of the proposed rule
extends to unclassified “DoD information,” which is defined as “any nonpublic
information that . . . [h]as not been cleared for public release”).
263. Federal Acquisition Regulation:
Basic Safeguarding of Contractor
Information Systems, 77 Fed. Reg. at 51,497.
264. Id. at 51,497 (citing 44 U.S.C. § 3544(a)(1)(A)(ii)).
265. See id. (“This proposed rule applies to all Federal contractors and appropriate
subcontractors regardless of size or business ownership.”).
266. Id.; see also supra note 258 (describing the applicable information and areas in
which that information shall be protected).
267. Federal Acquisition Regulation:
Basic Safeguarding of Contractor
Information Systems, 77 Fed. Reg. at 51,499. This provision explains that “public
computers” are “those available for use by the general public in kiosks, hotel business
centers.” Id. In addition, web sites may restrict public access by means of “user
ID/password, user certificates, or other technical means, and that provide protection
via use of security technologies.” Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
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This “best level” requirement, however, is much less specific.
There is no definition of what technology or processes provide the
“best level of security and privacy available.”270 Further, there is no
directive as to how that “best level” is to be determined with the
“given facilities, conditions, and environment.”271 It would be
difficult for any contractor, much less a small business or
inexperienced contractor, to know whether it was complying with this
requirement. Interestingly, the requirements for transmitting voice
and fax information is tailored with relatively more specificity,
requiring that a contractor ensure that it transmits information “via
voice and fax only when the sender has a reasonable assurance that
access is limited to authorized recipients.”272 It is not clear why the
requirements for voice and fax transmission are more processoriented than transmitting e-mails, text messages, or blog posts.
Arguments can be made that an e-mail transmission, which by its
nature will go directly to one recipient, is more secure than a fax
transmission, which may be addressed to a particular recipient, but
which generally arrives to a centralized queue to which many others
have access. Despite the arguments that can be raised, there are
clearly differences in the safeguards prescribed for electronic
transmissions versus voice and fax transmissions.
For physical and electronic barriers, the requirement is, again,
prescriptive. It requires that information must be protected “by at
least one physical and one electronic barrier (e.g. locked container
or room, login and password) when not under direct individual
control.”273
Unlike the requirements for the safeguarding of
electronic transmissions, calling for consideration of “facilities,
conditions, and environment,” physical and electronic protections
are prescribed as basic minimums.274
Arguably, it would be
reasonable for a contractor to consider the same variables (facilities,
conditions, and environment) when determining whether to add
more levels of physical and electronic protections.
The requirements on intrusion protection are similar. They
require a contractor to provide “at a minimum” two protections

270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Compare id. (“Transmit email, text messages, blogs, and similar
communications . . . using technology and processes that provide the best level of
security and privacy available, given facilities, conditions, and environment.”), with id.
(“Protect information . . . by at least one physical and one electronic barrier . . . when
not under direct individual control.”).
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against computer intrusions and data compromise: one for current
malware protection, the other for security-related software
upgrades.275 The prescriptions are basic, but unlike the safeguarding
requirements applicable to electronic transmissions, they do not
address whether and under what circumstances additional safeguards
should be considered and applied.
2. The basic requirements appear not to be burdensome, but also appear
inconsistent
In the IRFA summary to this proposed rule, the DoD, NASA, and
GSA clarified that it would apply to both small and large businesses.276
The cost of the rule was not considered significant, since the firstlevel protective measures (including virus protection and software
patches) are typically employed as part of the regular course of doing
business.277 It was also concluded that the “prudent business practices
designed to protect an [IT] system are typically a common part of
everyday operations.”278
The DoD, GSA, and NASA expressly state that the proposed FAR
changes “may be altered as necessary to align with any future
direction given in response to ongoing efforts led by the National
Archives and Records Administration in the implementation of
Executive Order 13556 . . . on ‘Controlled Unclassified
Information’”279 It is possible that soon after the proposed rule is
implemented, it will have to change to accommodate the
implementation of the new approach to identifying and safeguarding
CUI throughout the government. In that respect, the proposed rule
may present additional compliance burdens that exceed the basic
steps necessary to ensure that government information is
safeguarded.
The proposed rule also clarifies that the new clause “is not
intended to implement any other, more specific safeguarding
requirements, or to conflict with any contract clauses or requirements
that specifically address the safeguarding of information or
information systems.”280 While it may be helpful to clarify that these
275. Id. (“Provide at a minimum the following protections against computer
intrusions and data compromise: (i) Current and regularly updated malware
protection services, e.g., anti-virus, antispyware. (ii) Prompt application of securityrelevant software upgrades, e.g., patches, service-packs, and hot fixes.”).
276. See id. at 51,497–98 (stating that this proposed rule applies to contractor and
subcontractors “regardless of size or business ownership”).
277. Id. at 51,497.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
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basic safeguards are intended to supplement and not supersede any
other contract requirements, the characterization of these safeguards
as an “extension” of FISMA requirements might lead a contractor to
conclude that meeting these basic requirements is sufficient to satisfy
any and all FISMA requirements that may be incorporated into a
particular contract. The fact remains that the information security
requirements under FISMA have expressly applied to contractors
handling federal information and information systems since FISMA’s
passage.281 Thus, contract clauses already exist that require FISMA
compliance for a contractor seeking to work with federal information
or information systems.282 The requirements under FISMA call for a
more risk-based approach to determining the appropriate level of
information security than the prescriptive approach established
under the proposed rule.283 Thus, characterizing the proposed rule
as an “extension” of FISMA presents a risk that small business
contractors or inexperienced contractors unfamiliar with FISMA
compliance may mistakenly rely only on the basic safeguards
prescribed, without appreciating or addressing the additional
considerations under FISMA. It is therefore important for federal
contracting professionals to incorporate all FISMA-related
requirements in applicable contracts.
IV. HOW TO BETTER ENSURE ALL BOATS WILL RISE WITH THE TIDE
Much of this Article has discussed the tension between the
government’s need to ensure robust information security and the
potential for new information security requirements to overwhelm
small business contractors or other contractors inexperienced in
information security requirements.
If information security
compliance becomes too cumbersome, the government risks
contractors choosing to forego contracting opportunities to avoid the
risk of liability that may arise from breaches or noncompliance.
There are some potential avenues within the federal procurement
system that could both account for the government’s need to ensure
higher levels of information security and help ensure that all
contractors have an opportunity to compete in such an environment.
281. See Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3541–3549
(2006) (stating that the purpose of the Act is to “provide for development and maintenance
of minimum controls required to protect Federal information and information systems”).
282. See Federal Acquisition Regulation: Basic Safeguarding of Contractor
Information Systems, 77 Fed. Reg. at 51,497 (discussing that the FISMA requires
information security compliance from contractors).
283. See generally 44 U.S.C. § 3544(a)–(b) (requiring the level of information
security provided be based on risk and magnitude of potential harm).
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These avenues involve either augmenting federal mentor-protégé
programs or adjusting some of the subcontracting limitations
established under the FAR to account for higher levels of information
security.
A. Amend Mentor-Protégé Programs To Provide for Information Security
and Cybersecurity Compliance Assistance
Mentor-Protégé programs have been established under the SBA
and a number of other federal agencies to encourage large “mentor”
businesses to provide various forms of business development
assistance to “protégé” firms,284 usually members of the SBA’s 8(a)
In exchange for business
Business Development program.285
development assistance, mentors are eligible to enter into joint
ventures with their small business protégés to pursue certain small
business and 8(a) set-aside contracts for which the large businesses
would normally be ineligible.286
Each mentor-protégé agreement, required to be in written form,
must provide an assessment of the protégé’s needs, a detailed
description of the way in which the mentor will address those needs,
and a timeline for the delivery of the mentor’s assistance.287
Assistance provided under the SBA program includes “management
and/or technical assistance, loans and/or equity investments,
cooperation on joint venture projects, or subcontracts under prime
contracts being performed by the mentor.”288 Under the DoD
Program, a developmental program devised for the protégé concern
will describe how the mentor’s assistance will not only increase the
protégé’s ability to participate in federal and commercial contracts
284. See generally 13 C.F.R. § 124.520 (2012) (explaining the rules governing SBA’s
Mentor/Protégé program).
285. To be a participant in the SBA’s 8(a) Business Development program, a
concern must be a small business that demonstrates potential for success and is
unconditionally owned and controlled by one or more socially and economically
disadvantaged individuals. See id. § 124.101. The regulations governing the 8(a)
Business Development program also govern the SBA’s mentor-protégé program. See
id. § 124.520(c)(2) (“Only firms that are in good standing in the 8(a) [Business
Development] program . . . may qualify as a protégé.”). Mentor-protégé programs
have been established in twelve other federal agencies in addition to the SBA. See
WILLIAM B. SHEAR, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-548R, MENTORPROTÉGÉ PROGRAMS HAVE POLICIES THAT AIM TO BENEFIT PARTICIPANTS BUT DO NOT
REQUIRE POSTAGREEMENT TRACKING 1 (2011). Of note, the Department of Defense
has a mentor-protégé program that allows large business mentors to work with 8(a)
Business Development program participants in order to gain access to certain small
business set-aside requirements. The Department of Defense mentor-protégé
program regulations are found in Appendix I to DFARS. FAR § 219.7101.
286. 13 C.F.R. § 124.520(d).
287. Id. § 124.520(e).
288. Id.
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and subcontracts, but also increase subcontracting opportunities for
small businesses in industries where small firms are less dominant.289
In recent years, mentor-protégé programs have expanded
throughout the government.290
Aside from the DoD, which
established its mentor-protégé program in 1991, twelve other federal
agencies have since established mentor-protégé programs.291 Further,
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 recently
directed the SBA to establish a mentor-protégé program aimed at
assisting not just 8(a) small businesses, but all small businesses.292
Consequently, the mentor-protégé program has a significant
presence in the federal acquisition system.
One way to ensure small businesses are not left behind by new
information security regulations is to add an element to mentorprotégé agreements that expressly calls for large business mentors to
provide investment, training, and technical assistance geared to
ensuring the small business is well-equipped to satisfy information
security requirements. If the SBA and other federal agencies added
this type of assistance to their mentor-protégé program agreements,
they would likely increase the incentives already found in mentorprotégé programs. Agencies would have stronger assurance that their
small business protégés were receiving guidance, resources, and
training to ensure information security compliance. Mentors would
continue to have access to small business set-aside contracts.
A mentor working with a protégé as part of a joint venture would
likely position itself well in competitions for contracts requiring
information security and cybersecurity compliance. The mentor
would also have the benefit of knowing if flow-down information
security requirements were being satisfied in virtue of its close
connection with the small business protégé. The nature of the
mentor-protégé relationship would thus allow for a more free-flowing
exchange of information between the parties. In the event of a
breach or any other information security-related issues, the mentor
would be in a position to help the protégé address the issues
immediately and appropriately.

289. FAR app. I-107(f).
290. See SHEAR, supra note 285, at 15 (listing the years in which each federal
mentor-protégé program was implemented).
291. Id.
292. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, Pub. L. No. 112239, sec. 1641, § 45(a)(2), 126 Stat. 1632, 2077 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 657r
(amending the Small Business Act § 45 to authorize establishment of “a mentor
protégé program for all small business concerns”).
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A mentor-protégé program that expressly provided for information
security and cybersecurity investment and assistance in protégés
would likely be a significant incentive to small businesses. It would
put them in a position to compete for requirements calling for
information security and cybersecurity compliance through the aid of
a large business mentor. With the assistance of a mentor-protégé
program, small businesses would have an introduction to information
security and cybersecurity requirements, and learning from these
opportunities they could further develop expertise in the field.
Doing so would help foster competition for federal agencies
requiring information security and cybersecurity compliance from
contractors, while at the same time helping to ensure that
competitors are well-versed in all of the requirements necessary to
assure adequate levels of security.
B. Amend the Fifty Percent Rule To Accommodate Contracts Requiring
Information Security and Cybersecurity Compliance to Foster Increased Small
Business Involvement
Another potential manner to foster small business participation in
contracts calling for information security and cybersecurity
protections involves adjusting the levels under the fifty percent rule.
The fifty percent rule is based in the provisions of FAR clause 52.21914, Limitations on Subcontracting.293 Under the clause, at least fifty
percent of the contract performance must be reserved for the
concern where the contract or a portion of the contract for services
or manufacturing of supplies has been set aside for small businesses
or 8(a) concerns.294
Generally under small business set-aside contracts, a small business
must perform work for at least fifty percent of the cost of contract
performance for employees or manufacturing of supplies.295 This
helps to ensure that subcontractors are performing substantial
portions of the work under a set-aside contract rather than being
treated merely as pass-through business concerns. Further, the small
business regulations administered by the SBA require that small
business prime contractors perform substantial work.296
This
293. FAR § 52.219-14.
294. Id. § 52.219-14(b).
295. See id. A contract for services requires “[a]t least 50 percent of the cost of
contract performance incurred for personnel shall be expended for employees of
the concern.” A contract for supplies calls for the concern to “perform work for at
least fifty percent of the cost of manufacturing the supplies, not including the cost of
materials.” Id.
296. See 13 C.F.R. § 121.103(h)(4).
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requirement, referred to as the “ostensible subcontractor rule”
prevents a large business subcontractor from performing “primary
and vital requirements of a contract.”297 The ostensible subcontractor
rule also applies to a subcontractor on which a small business prime
is “unusually reliant.”298 In that case, all aspects of the relationship
are considered, including, but not limited to; contract management,
technical responsibilities, and the percentage of subcontracted
work.299
There are some instances, however, where the restrictions of the
fifty percent rule do not apply.300 As can be seen from construction
contracts, certain types of contracts necessitate a change in the
percentage breakdown. Those contracts, under which general
contractors perform a lower percentage of the work relative to their
aggregated subcontractors’ work, require much less of a work share
for subcontractors.301 This reflects a reality of the construction
industry and is an equitable means of ensuring subcontractors
perform their necessary share of set-aside contracts, but not more
than would be regularly expected in the industry.
The same could be applied to small business prime contractors on
contracts with information security or cybersecurity-related
requirements. It may be that percentages could be developed that
would limit a small business prime contractor’s work share to a
percentage lower than fifty percent, and would not include
requirements for information security and cybersecurity
compliance.302
Further, the “ostensible subcontractor rule” might be altered to
allow a carve-out for those responsibilities for information security
and cybersecurity compliance. Doing so would reduce the risk of the
SBA finding a large business is an “ostensible subcontractor,” based
on its efforts to ensure compliance with information security and
cybersecurity requirements.
Though such an approach would not foster the degree of hands-on
engagement between large business mentors and small business
protégés under a mentor-protégé program, it could help incentivize

297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. See FAR § 52.219-14(b)(3) (describing the percentage breakdown for general
construction contracts).
301. Id. (requiring the contractor to perform a smaller percentage of general
construction and construction by special trade contractors).
302. The large business subcontractor would be responsible for ensuring
compliance.
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small businesses and large businesses to enter into teams to compete
for set-aside procurements, which would allow the large business
contractor to address information security and cybersecurity
compliance. In that respect, federal agencies would still be able to
include small businesses in procurements requiring information
security and cybersecurity compliance. Small businesses, in turn,
would be less constrained from competing for these requirements,
knowing that they would not have to face the compliance issues
alone. Further, large businesses would have an incentive to team up
with small businesses, as they would be able to capture more than fifty
percent of a set-aside contract. This would likely foster a trade-off for
large businesses. In exchange for dedicating resources to assuring
information security and cybersecurity compliance for itself and its
small business partner, the large business would have more than a
fifty percent share of the work awarded under the contract.
C. Establish Information Security Training Requirements Similar to Recent
Privacy Training Mandates
A direct means of ensuring that small businesses and larger
businesses lacking experience working with the federal government
could be prepared to comply with information security and
cybersecurity requirements would be to mandate compliance
training. This would reflect FAR Case 2010-013, Federal Acquisition
Regulation; Privacy Training, 2010-13.303 The rule was proposed to
require privacy training for contractors.304
Agencies proposed minimum requirements for privacy training to
ensure consistency across the government. The rule intended to
ensure that contractors, regardless of the agency they were servicing,
were cognizant of seven mandatory elements of privacy.305 Privacy
Training mandated that although agency-provided privacy training
would be sufficient, the contractor itself could develop the training
package.306 Either way, any contractor employee involved in handling
information protected under the Privacy Act would be aware of the
minimum requirements necessary to safeguard the information.
303. Privacy Training, 76 Fed. Reg. 63,896 (proposed Oct. 14, 2011) (to be
codified at FAR pts. 24, 52).
304. Id. at 63,897 (proposing “to ensure that contractors identify employees who
require access to a Government system of records, handle personally identifiable
information, or design, develop, maintain, or operate a system of records on behalf
of the Federal Government, and who therefore, are required to complete privacy
training initially upon award of the procurement and at least annually thereafter”).
305. Id.
306. Id.
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The same model might be developed for ensuring satisfaction of
information security and cybersecurity compliance requirements.
The requirements to ensure adequate information security and
cybersecurity protections are arguably broader than Privacy Act
compliance requirements. Incorporating a training mandate to
cover at least a basic level of security requirements might help put
small business and inexperienced larger business contractors on a
more level playing field with other government contractors. The
training might not immediately equip a contractor to comply with
information security or cybersecurity requirements.
It might,
however, train those contractors on the steps necessary to ensure
compliance with all relevant requirements. For instance, if a training
gave contractors information on the review, consideration, and
application of security controls under NIST SP 800-53, it may not put
them in a position to immediately comply with information security
and cybersecurity requirements. But it might give them the tools to
move toward a posture of compliance.
The recently proposed basic safeguarding requirements under FAR
Case 2011-020 represent a possible step in the direction toward a
training mandate. But the steps required would likely be less geared
toward what specific actions to take in achieving adequate security307
and more geared toward what considerations to make. Under a riskbased mitigation scheme, such as that established under FISMA, a
training giving contractors the tools to understand what types of riskbased analyses to undertake would help ensure small businesses and
inexperienced contractors have more information available so as to
ascertain how they could compete for requirements necessitating
information security protections.
D. Continue Information Sharing To Clarify Information Security
Compliance
Some of the more positive steps taken in information security and
cybersecurity in recent years are: the emphasis on information
sharing and the consistent application of protections across the
government.308 To date, the proposed rules prescribe requirements
that government contractors must follow in order to properly ensure
307. For example, ensuring one physical security and one electronic security
element.
308. See generally Federal Acquisition Regulation:
Basic Safeguarding of
Contractor Information Systems, 77 Fed. Reg. 51,496 (proposed Aug. 24, 2012) (to
be codified at FAR pts. 4, 7, 12, 42, 52); Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation
Supplement: Safeguarding Unclassified DoD Information, 76 Fed. Reg. 38,089
(proposed June 29, 2011) (to be codified at FAR pts. 204, 252).
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information security.
None of the rules, however, require
contracting officers across departments or agencies to share
information about compliance requirements. It could be that efforts
to share that type of information could establish some consistency in
the application of information security or cybersecurity requirements.
It could vary from contracting officer to contracting officer as to what
actions or protections established by a contractor might amount to
adequate compliance. The more inconsistency in the system, the
more a particular contractor will find it difficult to comply across
departments and agencies. This could limit the ability of a contractor
to seek out other departments and agencies to provide relevant
services.
If there is some consistency, however, a contractor can more easily
seek out work with other departments and agencies in an effort to
diversify and increase its share of contracts. Small businesses and
larger inexperienced contractors would benefit from this consistency
in particular, as it would lower both the cost and the risk of enduring
varying compliance standards across different agencies. Even these
basic efforts could help cultivate the involvement of small businesses
and larger inexperienced contractors in their efforts to keep up with
the rising tide of cybersecurity regulations.
E. Consider an Iterative Approach to Compliance Requirements
The movement from the DoD’s proposed rule on handling CUI to
the more general proposed rule from the DoD, GSA, and NASA
requiring basic information security requirements serves as a helpful
model for allowing more contractor involvement in compliance
efforts. The DoD proposed rule was broad in scope and, by its own
analysis, threatened to impose a disproportionate cost of compliance
on small businesses.
The subsequent rule establishing basic
information security requirements was almost the opposite. It was
intended to be applied to many government contractors, but
prescribed very basic minimum requirements. Though the proposed
rule for basic protections represents a tide that rises much more
gradually, it would more likely lift all “boats.” That is to say, it would
allow for greater compliance from a greater number of contractors,
including small businesses and inexperienced contractors.
If information security and cybersecurity regulations are
established in a more iterative process, it may allow for more
government contractors to keep pace and ensure compliance for all.
Iterative steps could be imposed in a number of ways. They might
first be applied under contracts exceeding a certain dollar value,
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which would help build familiarity with a requirement before it could
be applied to a broader range of contracts. Steps might also be
applied prescribing increasingly stringent levels of protection. For
example, agencies might build on the minimum basic requirements
under the recent proposed rule for most contractors by introducing a
basic class of high-level protections (some of which were reflected
under the DoD proposed rule). The high-level protections might
focus on one aspect of information security compliance, in an effort
to lower the relative cost and risk for small businesses and
inexperienced contractors to bear. This more iterative approach
would help keep contractors involved in the regulatory process and
prevent small businesses from falling behind in compliance efforts.
In conclusion, the few proposed changes in this section present an
opportunity and an incentive for the government and its contracting
community to engage in information security and cybersecurity
compliance. All parties would benefit from these changes. Small
businesses and larger inexperienced contractors would have access to
opportunities they might otherwise avoid for lack of resources and
experience.
Large businesses would have access to set-aside
contracting opportunities and would have the chance to foster
further development of small business partners. They would also
have a hand in ensuring that their joint ventures or teams were
compliant, given the nature of interaction fostered in significant
amount by mentor-protégé requirements and to a lesser degree in
the context of an augmented fifty percent rule, allowing for greater
large-business subcontractor involvement. The government would
have an incentive to share information between and among agencies,
as it would help ensure the agencies’ respective contractors were
consistent in their compliance efforts. The government would also
have an incentive to require information security and cybersecurity
training, as it would help ensure all contractors were cognizant of
basic information security requirements. Through these proposed
steps, the government would be able to satisfy its increasing need for
information security and cybersecurity compliance.
It could
prescribe greater degrees of security as cyber risks grow more
prevalent, while also remaining assured that no segments of the
contracting community are left behind.
CONCLUSION
As this Article has explored, the government has had to increase
information security and cybersecurity regulation in order to keep
pace with ever-changing technology and increased frequency and

BANCROFT.OFF_TO_WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

1202

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

7/3/2013 10:44 AM

[Vol. 62:1145

damage brought about by cyberattacks and information leaks.
Though the government has not had success across the board in
implementing more stringent regulations, it is clear that both the
legislative and the executive branches are intent on ensuring that
information security and cybersecurity are addressed, particularly
within the government contracts industry.
Absent from the laws and regulations proposed to date has been
significant consideration for the effects increased security
requirements will have on small businesses or larger, relatively
inexperienced contractors that are just getting involved in contracts
with the federal government or new federal agencies calling for
information security compliance. The result of this trend is a rising
tide of increased security requirements, which leads to better
information security and cybersecurity protections. The rising tide,
however, threatens to leave behind any contractors not equipped
with the resources or the experience to keep pace with the many new
requirements.
The key issues presented are twofold: 1) either small business and
larger inexperienced businesses will not have the opportunity to
compete for an increasing number of contracts, or 2) these
businesses will try to comply with the requirements, but the lack of
resources and experience to do so may leave themselves vulnerable to
security breaches.
With that being the case, federal agencies should consider
incorporating incentives, protections, or training requirements, and
increased opportunities for information sharing that would help
small businesses and larger inexperienced businesses get involved in
contracts, even where information security and cybersecurity
compliance are necessities. Further, the government may want to
engage in an iterative process of information security and
cybersecurity regulation. That will help ensure the rising tide of
regulatory requirements is not so steep as to cut out potential small
businesses or other inexperienced contractors. But in any event, the
solutions should be structured to incentivize the involvement of all
parties in opportunities that call for increased levels of information
security and cybersecurity. In so doing, the government will be
developing strength throughout all segments of the federal
contracting community and ensuring that all boats have the ability to
rise with the tide.

